As Putin shakes hands with Modi, Xi, here’s the state of Russia’s allies
Russian President Vladimir Putin (L), Chinese President Xi Jinping (C) in Tianjin, China, on Aug. 31, 2025 (Alexander Kazakov/Pool/AFP via Getty Images)
After three years of international isolation, Russian President Vladimir Putin is back at the forefront of the global stage.
On Sept. 1 he was pictured standing shoulder to shoulder with the leaders of China and India, as Chinese President Xi Jinping opened the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin and called for a new world order.
"We must continue to take a clear stand against hegemonism and power politics, and practise true multilateralism," he said.
It's a far cry from the Putin of 2023 who was then being mocked for having to turn to North Korea for international support, such was the degradation of Russia's global standing since the launch of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
One of the other signs of major geopolitical shifts in recent weeks was U.S. President Donald Trump's meeting with Putin in Alaska, which marked another turning point in how the world engages with Russia.
Though the Alaska summit ended without a ceasefire, it underscored a significant development: Moscow’s international isolation is beginning to erode.
Trump declined to impose new sanctions, echoed Russia’s calls for a broader peace deal, and invited Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky for follow-up talks in Washington.
For Russia’s allies — from North Korea and Iran to China and Hungary — the summit signaled a change in narrative. Supporting Moscow is no longer seen solely as support for war, but as support for "peace" — on Russia’s terms.
Some responded swiftly. Hungary’s Viktor Orban refused to sign the EU’s joint statement backing Ukraine and called for an EU-Russia summit. Slovakia’s Robert Fico praised the Alaska talks and repeated Kremlin propaganda about the war’s "historical roots" and the need for "security guarantees" for both sides.
Putin also held calls with leaders of China, North Korea, and Belarus ahead of the summit, briefing them on the negotiations and reaffirming strategic cooperation.
Here’s a closer look at who stands with Russia in 2025, and how they help sustain the war.
Belarus — Russia’s ever-closer ally
Even before 2022, Belarus was Russia`s closest ally in Europe.
The two countries were formally united in the 1999 "Union State" agreement. Under President Alexander Lukashenko, Belarus relied heavily on Russian energy subsidies and loans while also integrating its military systems with those of Russia.
Tensions between the two countries flared occasionally, most notably during the mass protests in 2020 against Lukashenko’s contested re-election, but Moscow stepped in to help him forcibly remain in power.
Since then, Belarus has moved even closer into Moscow’s sphere of influence, becoming increasingly dependent on the Kremlin. As of mid-2025, Belarus’s economic growth had slowed to just 2.1%, while inflation hovered around 7.3%, according to Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service.
Russia continues to dominate Belarus’s trade structure, accounting for over 60% of total trade turnover, and supplies the vast majority of its energy.
So it came as no surprise when, at the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Belarus emerged as one of its most loyal partners.
In early 2022, Belarus allowed Russian forces to launch their offensive on Kyiv from its territory. Since then, it has continued to host Russian troops, weapons, and military infrastructure, serving as a key logistical base for Moscow.
In 2023, Ukrainian intelligence reported that Belarus possesses nuclear weapon delivery systems, though Russian warheads have not been deployed on its territory. Moscow is also expected to deploy the Oreshnik intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) to Belarus by the end of 2025.Belarus has also threatened to move the joint Russian-Belarusian Zapad-2025 military drills, which are scheduled for September, closer to NATO borders, further escalating tensions with the West.
Iran — a strategic partnership set to deepen
Russia and Iran have long maintained a practical partnership, often united by their opposition to the West and cooperation in Syria before the toppling of President Bashar al-Assad last year.
While they worked together in the military sphere, especially in supporting the Assad regime, they also competed for influence and rarely saw each other as full allies.
After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, ties deepened. Iran became a key supplier of drones used in attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure, while Russia offered military technology in return.
Iran’s Shahed drones became the basis for Russia’s own domestically produced versions, such as the Geran-1 and Geran-2, which continue to be used in the war.
In September 2024, Iran reportedly delivered over 200 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia, further fueling concerns in the West about escalating arms transfers. Trade between the two countries has also increased, with Iran helping Russia bypass Western sanctions.
In early 2025, Russia and Iran signed a formal treaty on strategic partnership, signaling their intent to expand cooperation further, including in nuclear energy, infrastructure, and defense.
North Korea — sending Moscow troops, and more
North Korea has emerged as one of Russia’s closest wartime allies.
Ties between Russia and North Korea had been limited in recent decades, but that changed with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Driven by Russia’s need for ammunition and North Korea’s need for food, energy, and military technology, the two countries rapidly deepened their cooperation.
In June 2024, Moscow and Pyongyang signed a mutual defense treaty, the first of its kind since the Cold War. Unlike Russia’s agreement with Iran, this pact included explicit commitments to provide military support to help each other in case of an attack.
Soon after, reports emerged that North Korea had deployed up to 12,000 troops to Russian territory to support positions in Kursk Oblast, where Russia faced Ukrainian incursion.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called the development "very dangerous" and warned that "it opens a new page of this war."
By mid-2025, North Korea had reportedly supplied Russia with over 12 million rounds of 152 mm artillery shells, delivered in nearly 28,000 shipping containers. It also transferred more than 100 ballistic missiles, many of which have been used to strike Ukrainian cities.
Altogether, these shipments account for up to 40% of Russia’s total ammunition supply in the war, according to South Korean and independent intelligence assessments.
In addition, another 25,000–30,000 North Korean troops are reportedly being prepared for future deployment to support Russian operations on occupied Ukrainian territory.
China — from rivals to partners
China has not condemned Russia’s war against Ukraine and positions itself as "neutral," but it continues to provide the materials, trade routes, and political cover that help Russia sustain the war.
During the Cold War, the two were initially allies but later split into ideological and geopolitical rivals. Yet since the 2000s, their ties have improved, and deepened even further after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, driven by shared opposition to the West and growing economic cooperation.
In 2023, China became Russia’s largest trade partner, with bilateral trade surpassing $200 billion and continuing to rise in 2024 and 2025, largely due to increased imports.
Military cooperation between China and Russia is also growing. In May 2025, Xi joined Putin in Moscow for Victory Day, where they pledged to deepen ties and called their countries "friends of steel." The two militaries held joint naval drills in the Sea of Japan earlier this month.
In April, President Volodymyr Zelensky claimed that China is supplying weapons to the Russian military. According to Ukraine’s intelligence, China has also supplied chemicals, gunpowder components, and machine tools used by Russian defense factories.
Moreover, at least 163 Chinese nationals were reportedly serving in Russia’s army as of April. Zelensky said Beijing is aware, as Russia promotes military recruitment through Chinese social media.
In July, the U.S. introduced a new strategy aimed at forcing Russia to end the war. It included tariffs and secondary sanctions targeting countries that support Russia’s wartime economy. China became a key focus, as its trade with Russia kept growing.
Washington asked China to stop buying Russian oil and sending dual-use goods, but on August 4, just days before the sanctions were set to begin on August 8, Beijing rejected the demand.
Ties between the two countries are set to deepen with this week's SCO summit. Putin met both Xi and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, two major economies that have become a crucial economic lifeline for Russia during the full-scale war and are leading buyers of its oil.
India — fuelling Russia’s war economy
Before the full-scale invasion, India and Russia had long-standing ties, especially in defense and energy. Russia was and remains India’s largest arms supplier.
The two countries have also been cooperating within BRICS, a group of emerging economies aiming to counter Western influence.
Since 2022, India has significantly increased its imports of Russian oil, often framing these purchases as a matter of national interest. In 2024–2025, India set a two-year record in Russian oil imports, signed a record-long supply deal, and saw Russia as its top supplier of naphtha.
Despite warnings from the U.S., including threats of tariffs from Donald Trump’s team, Indian officials have stated that purchases will continue.
In April 2025, an Indian-made component was found in a Russian attack drone. It was the first confirmed case of such involvement, according to Ukrainian intelligence.
Like China, India has not condemned Russia’s invasion but has tried to maintain a neutral public stance. However, while Xi joined Putin for the 2025 Victory Day parade, Modi declined the invitation.
But the relationship appears to have warmed since — at the SCO summit on Sept. 1 Putin and Modi were pictured holding hands as they met with Xi.
Syria — entering a post-Assad era
Russian-Syrian military and political cooperation deepened dramatically during the Syrian civil war, when Russia intervened in 2015 to help Bashar al-Assad stay in power.
For nearly a decade, Assad relied on Russian airpower, weapons, and diplomatic support to retain control. Russia, in turn, used Syria as a testing ground for weapons and a platform to expand its influence in the region.
By 2024, Assad’s regime started to crumble. With Russia focused on its war in Ukraine and unable to offer the same level of support, it gradually pulled out some of its military assets. As loyalist forces weakened, Assad fled to Russia, marking the end of his rule.
After Assad’s fall, Ukraine signaled readiness to restore ties with Syria. In early 2025, a Ukrainian delegation visited Damascus — the first such visit in years.
Kyiv also sent 500 tons of wheat flour as humanitarian aid. These steps were widely seen as part of Ukraine’s broader effort to counter Russian influence in Syria and the region.
Still, Moscow hasn’t let go of Syria entirely. In April, Syria’s new leader, Al-Sharaa, hinted that military ties with Moscow could continue, noting the country’s long-standing reliance on Russian weapons. In mid-2025, reports emerged of Russian grain being shipped to Syria, marking the first such delivery since Assad’s exile.
At the same time, signs of growing distance between Damascus and Moscow have emerged. In May, Reuters reported that Syria plans to print its new currency in Germany and the UAE instead of Russia, ending a decade-long wartime arrangement.
The decision reflects a broader shift in Syria’s foreign and economic policy as the country moves toward deeper ties with Arab and Western partners and away from Moscow.Experts say the fall of Assad’s regime may weaken Russia’s position in the Middle East and hurt its global image, which could indirectly benefit Ukraine. Unlike Assad, who supported Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, Syria’s new leadership has not made such statements.
Hungary — Orban as a useful ally
Hungary has traditionally maintained close relations with Russia. It relies heavily on Russian gas and has deepened cooperation through projects like the expansion of its Paks nuclear power plant, which is being financed and built by Russia’s Rosatom.
Since 2022, Hungary has positioned itself as one of the most pro-Russian voices within the European Union.
Prime Minister Viktor Orban has consistently opposed tougher sanctions against Moscow and blocked or delayed multiple EU aid packages to Ukraine.
He saw Ukraine as a “buffer zone” rather than a future EU member, warning that Kyiv’s accession would “drag the war” into Europe. Orban has vowed to “do everything” to prevent Ukraine from joining the bloc.
In June 2025, Hungary and Slovakia blocked the EU’s 18th sanctions package against Russia. A month later, Orban proposed “strategic cooperation” with Ukraine as an alternative to full EU integration.
Relations between Ukraine and Hungary became even more strained in 2024, when a spy scandal revealed that Hungary’s counterintelligence agency had been surveilling Ukrainian diplomats and passing information to Russia.
Slovakia — from Ukraine supporter to Russia’s friend
Slovakia was initially among Ukraine’s supporters in the early stages of Russia’s full-scale invasion. In 2022 and 2023, it provided military aid, including MiG-29 fighter jets, and its parliament officially designated Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism.
But that changed dramatically after populist leader Robert Fico returned to power in late 2023. His government immediately halted military aid to Ukraine and adopted an openly pro-Russian stance. Fico has since worked to block or weaken EU sanctions against Moscow.
Fico became the first EU prime minister to give an interview to Russia’s state TV. In May 2025, he visited Moscow for Victory Day celebrations.
Turkey — Russia’s friend in trade and tourism
While their geopolitical interests frequently diverge, Russia and Turkey have maintained close cooperation in trade and energy.
Russia is a key supplier of natural gas to Turkey, and the two countries cooperated on major projects like the Akkuyu nuclear power plant and the TurkStream pipeline.
After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Turkey positioned itself as a mediator. It supplied Ukraine with Bayraktar drones in the early stages of the war, played a central role in the Black Sea Grain Initiative, and helped broker prisoner swaps.
At the same time, Ankara refused to join Western sanctions against Russia and expanded trade, tourism, and financial cooperation with Moscow. This balancing act continued through 2024 and 2025.
In July, Istanbul hosted the third round of peace talks between Russia and Ukraine, which led to another major prisoner exchange but no breakthrough on ending the war.
Days before the Trump-Putin summit in Alaska, Erdogan spoke by phone with Zelensky and reiterated that Turkey is ready to host further negotiations with Ukraine’s full participation.
"President Erdogan clearly stated that any negotiations without Ukraine will not bring lasting peace. We equally understand all the risks and threats," Zelensky wrote after the call.
Despite its deepening economic ties with Russia, Turkey maintains its NATO commitments and has not recognized the annexation of Crimea or other occupied territories.
