KI short logo

Russia's newest strike drones still depend on Western technology

6 min read

A police expert examines the engine of a Russian Geran-5 jet-powered drone near a residential building damaged in a Russian attack in Kyiv, Ukraine, on Oct. 15, 2026. (Oleksandr Gusev / NurPhoto via Getty Images)

D

Dmytro Shumlianskyi

Ukrainian journalist specializing in military technology and defense affairs

With years of sanctions and regulations from the West, Russia has learned to replace Western components in its weapons with Chinese alternatives.

Even Russia's Geran-2 strike drones, which historically relied heavily on Western components, now increasingly include Chinese equivalents that can be supplied without the gray-market import schemes and sanctions workarounds that complicate logistics and raise costs for Moscow.

By May 2026, Chinese components accounted for 65% of the foreign electronics identified in Geran-2 drones.

Yet Russia's latest strike drones reveal a persistent weakness in the Kremlin's efforts to reduce that dependence: American electronics still make up the bulk of their foreign components.

Despite years of sanctions, Western technology continues to find its way into weapons used to attack Ukraine.

This is especially evident in the new models of Geran — the Geran-4 jet-powered drones and the Geran-5 small-sized cruise missiles, which Russia is now prioritizing.

"Researchers identified Texas Instruments processors, for example, on multiple circuit boards in both drones."

An examination of their wreckage reveals that Western electronics still play a major role in their design, with just American manufacturers accounting for more than 70% of identified foreign components.

At Militarnyi, we obtained the results of examinations of both drone models, which provide a detailed picture of their components and manufacturing origins.

One Geran-4 shot down by Ukrainian forces in August 2026 contained at least 98 components manufactured in countries allied with Ukraine. Of these, 76 were American, 10 Chinese, seven Taiwanese, three German, and one each Swiss and Canadian.

The Geran-5, neutralized by Ukrainian forces in September, contained 115 identified foreign components, including 81 American, 11 Chinese, 11 Taiwanese, five Japanese, four German, and three Swiss.

Fragments of a downed Russian Geran-5 drone in an undisclosed location, Ukraine, undated.
Fragments of a downed Russian Geran-5 drone in an undisclosed location, Ukraine, in an undated photo by the Ukrainian Defense Forces. (Militarnyi)

American manufacturers, including Texas Instruments, Analog Devices, Amphenol, Onsemi, Vishay, Micron, and Monolithic Power Systems, supply components used in flight computers, power distribution systems, navigation equipment, and engine controls. Their products help drones process information, maintain flight, communicate, and control their engines.

The presence of these components also extends to newer production batches.

Researchers identified Texas Instruments processors, for example, on multiple circuit boards in both drones.

Some components were manufactured in late 2025 and early 2026, suggesting that Russia continues to obtain relatively recent Western electronics rather than relying exclusively on old stockpiles.

The supply chain is increasingly complicated, however. China is moving beyond simply supplying individual components and is becoming directly involved in manufacturing electronic assemblies for Russian weapons.

Both the Geran-4 and Geran-5 use onboard flight computers manufactured in China specifically for Alabuga, the Russian production facility responsible for assembling the drones. These computers incorporate navigation boards, processors, and other electronic modules, including Western-made components.

An optical system with a laser rangefinder from a Geran-4 drone in an undisclosed location, Ukraine, undated.
An optical system with a laser rangefinder recovered from a downed Russian Geran-4 drone in an undisclosed location, Ukraine, in an undated photo by the Ukrainian Defense Forces. (Militarnyi)

The Geran-5 also uses a Chinese-made power distribution unit produced to Alabuga's specifications.

Russia is also trying to localize parts of its production process. Its newer drones no longer necessarily rely on ready-made Chinese engines. Instead, the engines are assembled at Alabuga using Chinese-made parts, with Russian facilities carrying out mechanical fitting and final integration.

The Geran-4's engine, for example, uses Chinese-made fuel pumps and filters, while its control systems incorporate components from American and European manufacturers. The Geran-5 follows a similar approach. Its TRD 200 propulsion unit is assembled from Chinese parts, while its electronic engine control unit contains components from companies including American Analog Devices and Texas Instruments.

This arrangement allows Russia to bring more production operations under its own roof while still remaining dependent on foreign suppliers for critical technology.

China's role extends to communications equipment, too. Both drone models use the XK-F358 mesh modem manufactured by Shenzhen Xingkai Technology. The device transmits video, telemetry, and control commands, and similar modems have previously been identified in Geran-2 and Gerbera drones.

Dmytro Chubenko displays Russian Gerbera and Geran-2 drones in Kharkiv, Ukraine, on July 30, 2025.
Dmytro Chubenko of the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor's Office holds the remains of a Russian-made Gerbera drone beside a Geran-2 drone, in Kharkiv, Ukraine, on July 30, 2025. (Scott Peterson / Getty Images)

An October investigation by The Insider also shed light on the company's dealings with Russia.

Journalists traced equipment deliveries to Russian companies and found that Shenzhen Xingkai Technology offered a purported military equipment supplier working for Alabuga a batch of 500 modems for 19.5 million yuan, approximately $3 million.

The manufacturers themselves are aware that their products are ending up in Russian weapons. Vladyslav Vlasiuk, the Ukrainian president's commissioner for sanctions policy, told Militarnyi that some companies had reported 20 successful operations to block component supplies. Yet he also stressed that these efforts were insufficient, given how easily the products remained accessible to Russian manufacturers.

Russian Geran drones being produced at the Alabuga plant in Russia, on July 20, 2025.
Russian Geran drone production at the Alabuga drone manufacturing plant in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone, Russia, in a video released by the Russian Defense Ministry's TV channel on July 20, 2025. (Screenshot / Russian state TV)

The findings point to two priorities for Ukraine's international partners.

First, existing sanctions need to be enforced more effectively. The discussion of introducing additional restrictions often attracts political attention, but the components found in the Geran-4 and Geran-5 show that there are still significant gaps in the current system. Identifying intermediaries, tracing supply routes, and closing channels that allow restricted electronics to reach Russian manufacturers should be a priority.

Second, Western governments need to step up diplomatic pressure on China. Chinese companies are already supplying Russia with ready-made electronic assemblies and equipment produced specifically for its military industry. Some are also facilitating the transition from importing finished components to assembling more complex systems inside Russia.

The evidence of direct commercial dealings with Russian military suppliers makes it increasingly difficult to dismiss China's role.

Russia has adapted its supply chains and found ways to work around restrictions. Its newer drones demonstrate both the progress it has made in reducing reliance on Western suppliers and the limits of that effort. American electronics still account for the majority of identified foreign components in the Geran-4 and Geran-5.

For Ukraine's allies, the challenge is clear: sanctions must keep pace with Russia's changing production model. Closing existing loopholes and confronting companies that supply Russia's weapons industry will matter as much as announcing new restrictions.

Editor's Note: This opinion piece was produced in cooperation with Militarnyi, a Ukrainian media outlet specializing in defense and military affairs. The opinions expressed in the op-ed section are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the views of the Kyiv Independent.

D
Dmytro Shumlianskyi

Dmytro Shumlianskyi is a Ukrainian journalist specializing in military technology and defense affairs and an editor at Militarnyi. Author of the “PS Magazine Ukrainian Edition” project, dedicated to the maintenance of U.S.-made weapons.

Read more