'Unprecedented' earnings: 2 years on from Russia-North Korea pact, here's what Putin, Kim have gained

June 19 marks two years since Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un signed a mutual defense treaty in Pyongyang, bringing Russia and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) into their closest alignment since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In the two years since, DPRK troops have fought alongside Russian forces in the war against Ukraine. North Korean missiles have struck Ukrainian cities, and millions of exported artillery shells have helped fuel Russia's war machine. In return, Moscow has provided Pyongyang with economic support, diplomatic backing, and military cooperation, helping transform it from a pariah state into a more prominent international player.

The Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership commits each side to come to the other's defense "with all means in its possession" if it is attacked. Experts argue that the calculation behind it was practical for both governments. "The relationship is transactional," said Anar Shaikenova, director of the DPRK Strategic Research Center at KIMEP University in Kazakhstan.

Russia needed an ally, weapons, and men to keep fighting; North Korea needed money, technology, and a way out of isolation. The exchange has proven lucrative for both governments, though in very different ways.

Russia's side of the bargain

For Moscow, the partnership has delivered three valuable assets as its war in Ukraine drags on: ammunition, manpower, and a strategic partner that advances the Kremlin's broader geopolitical objectives.

With North Korea's help, Russia increased its artillery edge over Ukraine. In 2025, Kyrylo Budanov — then head of Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR), now head of the President's Office — said that up to 40% of the ammunition used by Russian forces in Ukraine originated from North Korea.

The scale of the transfers has been vast. A joint investigation by an independent Russian publication in exile, Important Stories, and the U.K.-based nonprofit Open Source Center identified four Russian cargo ships that made at least 112 voyages to North Korea over the last two and a half years, transporting an estimated 8 million to 11 million artillery rounds, primarily 122mm and 152mm shells.

"This allowed Russia to cover up to half or more of its artillery expenditure at the front, significantly reducing its dependence on domestic production and offsetting the effects of sanctions," said Dmytro Zhmailo, executive director of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center.

As a result, he added, Russian forces were able to maintain a higher volume of artillery fire along parts of the front line.

The volume of shipments appears to have declined in recent months, though transfers have continued.

North Korea has also supplied Russia with KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles, which Moscow uses to strike at Ukrainian civilians. While early versions often veered off course or failed in flight, Russian and North Korean specialists gradually improved the missiles' performance, according to Budanov. The latest variants can now strike targets within 50 to 100 meters.

"This has placed an additional burden on Ukraine's air defense system, as intercepting such targets requires expensive and limited resources, particularly systems such as the Patriot," Zhmailo says.

With only a small number of Patriot batteries available and a critical shortage of interceptor missiles, Ukraine faces growing difficulty defending against ballistic threats.

The partnership's most dramatic development is the deployment of North Korean soldiers in the war against Ukraine.

Beginning in October 2024, the DPRK sent an estimated 14,000 to 15,000 troops to Russia, most drawn from the 11th Corps of the Korean People's Army, an elite special operations formation known as the Storm Corps.

They were sent to Russia's Kursk Oblast, where Ukrainian forces had seized territory in a surprise offensive months earlier. Thrown into "human wave" frontal assaults, North Korean soldiers helped Russian troops retake the ground, though at a high cost.

By early 2026, South Korean intelligence agencies estimated that roughly 6,000 North Korean soldiers — more than a third of those deployed — had been killed or wounded fighting in Russia.

These losses were Russia's gain.

"Their use as assault infantry allowed the Russian command to reduce losses among its own population and postpone new waves of mobilization," Zhmailo says.

Beyond its immediate wartime benefits, the partnership aligns with Putin's broader foreign policy ambitions. As the Kremlin grows more hostile to what it sees as expanding U.S. influence in the Indo-Pacific, North Korea has become a valuable ally. Analysts argue that supporting a nuclear-armed state on the Korean Peninsula offers Moscow another avenue to project influence in the Indo-Pacific and to challenge Washington's strategic position in the region.

North Korea's side of the bargain

For Pyongyang, the partnership has delivered something it has sought for decades: a path out of isolation.

One of the clearest symbols of that transformation came in September 2025, when Kim Jong Un stood alongside Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin at a military parade in Beijing marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II. For a leader whose country had spent years under international isolation, the image was profound.

"Kim Jong Un, he was treated as an equal," Shaikenova explains. "Instead of being isolated, it looked like he had become an international player."

Pyongyang has also reaped substantial financial benefits from the partnership.

A March 2026 report by South Korea's Institute for National Security Strategy estimated that North Korea earned between $7.7 billion and $14.4 billion from military cooperation with Russia from August 2023 to the end of 2025. The upper estimate is roughly equivalent to the country's entire annual economic output. Most of the revenue comes from arms sales.

"This is an unprecedented type of earning for them," Shaikenova says.

Pyongyang has also received goods and technologies that would otherwise have been difficult to obtain under international sanctions. Russia has provided food, fuel (including petroleum reportedly delivered above U.N.-mandated limits), and support for North Korea's satellite, missile, air-defense, and submarine programs.

After years of failed attempts, Pyongyang successfully placed a reconnaissance satellite into orbit in 2023 — likely thanks to Putin's help.

North Korean troops get combat experience

The war has given North Korea something that money alone cannot buy: combat experience.

For the first time since the Korean War, North Korean troops are testing themselves in a modern conflict. According to HUR, North Korean personnel operating under Russian command have carried out artillery operations, aerial reconnaissance, and the adjustment of rocket and artillery strikes.

"Focusing on mastering unmanned technologies and gaining experience in modern warfare is a defining feature and one of the key objectives of the North Korean army's involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian war," HUR said in an assessment.

The agency noted that North Korean troops deployed to Russia's Kursk Oblast are regularly rotated home under agreements between Moscow and Pyongyang. About 3,000 soldiers had returned to North Korea by early 2026, many of whom later became instructors tasked with passing on battlefield lessons to the rest of the army.

"Most of them then become military instructors in order to pass on the 21st-century warfare skills they have acquired to the entire North Korean army," HUR said.

With more than one million active-duty personnel in its armed forces, North Korea could theoretically provide far more troops. Yet Pyongyang has committed only a small fraction of its military.

According to Shaikenova, the limitation reflects the regime's concern about exposing ordinary citizens to life beyond its borders.

"(Kim's) only sending those people whom they can trust," she said. "Otherwise, they would all flee."

"Sending people to fight in Ukraine is basically leaking people," she added. "They're seeing how other people are living much better lives."

The gains have not been limited to money, technology, or military experience. Russia has also helped erode the international pressure that constrained North Korea for decades.

In March 2024, Moscow vetoed the renewal of the U.N. Panel of Experts, which had monitored sanctions violations by North Korea since 2009. The panel's mandate expired weeks later.

A coalition of Western and Asian states has since established a replacement mechanism, but it lacks the authority of a U.N.-mandated body. Shaikenova calls the new mechanism "a poor substitute."

Russian officials have even thrown their support behind Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions. In July 2025, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Moscow understood "the reasons why they carry out their nuclear program," offering public backing to an arsenal that the U.N. Security Council has spent years attempting to constrain.

What does it mean for Ukraine — and can the partnership last?

The Moscow-Pyongyang alliance has intensified pressure on Ukraine.

For Kyiv, Zhmailo says, the challenge is "no longer only about countering Russia's internal resources, but about neutralizing an expanded supply network" stretching beyond Russia's borders to a country largely insulated from Western pressure.

"Without Pyongyang's support, it would now be far harder for the Kremlin to maintain the current intensity of combat," he explains. The flip side is that Ukraine now requires "larger-scale and more systemic support" from its own partners simply to keep pace.

Yet for all its intensity, the partnership's durability remains uncertain, largely because it is tied so closely to the war in Ukraine.

"There are lots of scholars who think this relationship will be over once the Russian-Ukrainian war stops," Shaikenova said. She counts herself among them.

The reason, she argues, is largely economic. Russia and North Korea are not natural trading partners: both economies export many of the same basic commodities, including coal, fish, and textiles, limiting opportunities for mutually beneficial trade. Bilateral commerce remains small, while North Korea's economic ties with China are much larger.

What binds Moscow and Pyongyang today is wartime necessity. Russia provides cash, fuel, and technology in exchange for the munitions and manpower it needs to keep fighting.

When that need disappears, Shaikenova expects the relationship to lose much of its momentum. A postwar Russia, she argues, will face labor shortages, demographic decline, and the costs of reconstruction and sanctions, leaving it less willing and less able to invest in its relationship with DPRK.

The partnership is also deeply personal.

"As long as Putin is in power, this relationship will continue," Shaikenova said.

A successor focused on Russia's economic recovery rather than geopolitical confrontation might see less value in maintaining such close ties with Pyongyang.