Russian opposition leaders often present themselves as champions of freedom and democracy, and are often embraced as such by well-meaning but sometimes naive Western donors. However, a closer examination reveals that their advocacy largely revolves around maintaining Russia as a unified and powerful state.
Far from being proponents of liberal values, these leaders are often pragmatic political operators vying for the position of successor to Russian President Vladimir Putin. They compete for funding and public support, which can lead to violent confrontations, as seen in the recent hammer attack on late Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s supporters allegedly orchestrated by associates of Russian businessman Mikhail Khodorkovsky. In order to stay relevant, they emphasize protecting the interests of Russia and Russians.
Maintaining the idea of Russian imperialism
“There are those who advocate for the urgent ‘decolonization’ of Russia, arguing to split our vast country into several smaller, safer states. However, these ‘decolonizers’ can’t explain why people with shared backgrounds and cultures should be artificially divided. Nor do they say how this process should even take place,” Yulia Navalnaya, Navalny’s widow, stated at the Bled Strategic Forum in Slovenia earlier in September.
Navalnaya raises a valid point about the lack of a unified strategy among the European Union and its Western allies regarding Russia’s future. However, it’s hard to overlook her strong endorsement of Russia as a state of consolidated peoples. Her stance on preserving Russia as a “great” and “unified” entity reflects a broader trend among Russian opposition figures, as echoed by Khodorkovsky at the “Russia Beyond Putin” panel at the GLOBSEC conference.
“It would be a mistake to say that the West is at war with the Russian nation. If the rhetoric claims ‘we are against Russians,’ the Russians won’t care. It is crucial to separate Russian people from Russian decision-makers; we need to say we are at war with Russian decision-makers,” Khodorkovsky, formerly the richest man in Russia, said.
Endorsing the idea of a unified Russia, even while opposing the Kremlin, ultimately supports the system of oppression that has long subjugated various ethnic groups and regions within its borders. Opposition figures who remain ambivalent about Chechnya, Tatarstan, or Crimea reveal their reluctance to confront the realities of Russian imperialism.
"Endorsing the idea of a unified Russia, even while opposing the Kremlin, ultimately supports the system of oppression."
While they may criticize Putin’s methods, they rarely challenge the underlying notion of a “strong” and “unified” Russia, which has persisted long before Putin and will likely continue unless fundamentally confronted. The problem extends beyond Putin and the Kremlin to the broader concept of Russia as an imperial entity, a notion deeply embedded in Russian political culture and perpetuated by both the regime and the opposition.
Such positions inherently sustain the oppression of the numerous nations within the Russian Federation, as well as historically and currently abused neighbors. Rather than addressing the fundamental issues, these leaders primarily target Putin and his closest advisors as figureheads. This focus often misleads Western policymakers, who may assume that those fleeing Russia oppose the system’s core values.
Opposition activities through a political lens
To better understand the Russian opposition in exile, consider that their primary motivation is political competition for leadership as an alternative or successor to Putin. This space is filled with diverse and often contradictory ideologies, from anarchists and fascists to communists and imperial monarchists. Within this environment, the Russian “liberal” opposition seeks to build broad support, constrained by the conservative and anti-Western attitudes of many Russians.
In August 2024, research by the Levada Center revealed that 54% of Russians are satisfied with their lives, and 66% are confident about their future. Interestingly, the highest satisfaction levels are among young people under 24 (75%).
Given this context, opposition leaders like Navalnaya and Khodorkovsky must cater to deeply conservative and anti-Western sentiments. They navigate a delicate balance between adopting a liberal façade to attract Western funding, while avoiding being outflanked by nationalists like Maxim Katz. They also compete with one another for funds and public support.
To remain relevant to the 20-25% of Russians dissatisfied with life, opposition leaders often advocate for reforming, rather than dismantling, the imperial structures of Russia. They focus on corruption, a key weakness of the Russian state, and a point of contention with foreign elites. Similarly, they criticize sanctions, as seen in statements from recently released opposition figures like Ilya Yashin, Vladimir Kara-Murza, and Andrei Pivovarov.
Alice Autin
A more fruitful approach to engagement
Pivovarov, known for his work with Open Russia, frames the struggle as one between the Russian people and the Kremlin, subtly deflecting responsibility from Russian society for enabling the Kremlin’s imperial policies. Despite these shortcomings, engaging with the Russian opposition and independent media can provide valuable insights into internal dynamics and FSB activities abroad. They still challenge the Kremlin’s monopoly on power and information, potentially limiting its unchecked operations.
However, this raises questions about whom to support. Under Navalnaya, the Anti-Corruption Foundation has arguably shifted from a genuine political project to a grant-seeking NGO, which may impact its effectiveness. Moreover, recent internal conflicts, such as the attack on Navalny’s aides Leonid Volkov and Ivan Zhdanov, may deepen divisions within the opposition, shifting focus from political activism to internal disputes.
Western governments and civil society organizations might find it more strategic to support regional actors and grassroots movements, like the Free Idel-Ural civil movement, or others that are more attuned to local realities and less prone to centralization issues.
Ultimately, the Russian opposition appears less concerned with justice or democratic values and more focused on advocating for the Russian nation under a different guise. Their inclination to prioritize Russia’s interests over universal principles of justice suggests that their goal is not the decolonization of Russian politics but the preservation of Russian influence in a more palatable form.
If they were truly committed to justice, they would champion the causes of oppressed nations, rather than prioritizing the Russian one.
Editor’s Note: The opinions expressed in the op-ed section are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the views of the Kyiv Independent.
