French President Emmanuel Macron and Polish Premier Donald Tusk met on Dec. 12 in Warsaw. High on the agenda was how to support Ukraine in the “new Transatlantic context.” On the sidelines of the visit, the Élysée emphasized that “France’s position is that it is necessary to support Ukraine for as long and as intensely as necessary for it to approach negotiations from a position of strength when the time comes.”
The two leaders also discussed the possibility of a European peacekeeping force in Ukraine — boots on the ground — in the event of a ceasefire. However, Tusk insisted during his press conference that “no such actions are foreseen at the moment.”
At the same time Macron and Tusk were addressing these issues, NATO’s new Secretary General Mark Rutte delivered his first major speech. Speaking about Russia, he warned that “danger is moving toward us at great speed” and that European allies are unprepared to deal with the threat. In 2023, only 23 of 32 NATO allies reached the agreed-upon 2% GDP defense spending target — a figure that is insufficient to ensure the safety of the Transatlantic space.
So, is this newfound European resolve good news for Ukraine? It could be, but there are significant dangers lurking behind the rhetoric.
The most obvious message is that the buzzword of the moment is “negotiations.” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has acknowledged that some form of temporary territorial concessions may be necessary in exchange for what he calls ironclad security guarantees.
The message from Warsaw is that the well-worn phrase “as long as it takes” now has a clear end goal: negotiating from a position of strength. This new rhetoric reflects a growing sense that under a future Trump administration, the U.S. might withdraw some or all of its military aid unless Ukraine agrees to negotiate with Russia.
"The message from Warsaw is that the well-worn phrase “as long as it takes” now has a clear end goal: negotiating from a position of strength."
The European Union cannot replace U.S. military aid without doubling its current support for Ukraine. The EU lacks the capacity to do so, and as Rutte emphasized in his speech, massive increases in defense spending and production capacity will be required to meet Europe’s own needs in the face of growing threats—not only from Russia but also from China and the increasingly volatile Middle East. A bad peace for Ukraine would only exacerbate European insecurity.
Rutte is also correct to highlight the need for increased European defense spending and domestic production. Spending on non-European production could hinder the continent’s ability to respond to direct threats, such as Russia continuing to menace Ukraine. Delays in France and the U.K. approving the use of Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles for strikes inside Russian territory stemmed from these missiles’ partial dependence on U.S. technology, which led to U.S. hesitation over potential Russian retaliation. Future European defense spending risks similar vetoes, underscoring the importance of prioritizing homegrown solutions.
Rutte’s speech emphasized the need for innovation and technology, calling on governments to invest and industry to take risks. His remarks echo former Ukrainian Chief of Staff Valerii Zaluzhnyi’s article in The Economist in November 2023.
A win-win solution for Europe and Ukraine would involve European companies investing in Ukraine’s growing defense industry. However, such investments will require government-backed or private insurance, and without robust security guarantees for Ukraine, only the bravest will take the plunge.
Which brings us to the thorniest question: What security guarantees for Ukraine would be worth more than the paper they are written on?
Zelensky is adamant that nothing less than NATO membership will suffice for Ukraine. He is correct. The Budapest Memorandum demonstrated that in the nuclear age, bilateral or multilateral security guarantees without a nuclear umbrella are meaningless when facing a nuclear-armed adversary.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s nuclear blackmail has shown that nuclear deterrence works. While his arsenal has not deterred Ukraine from striking inside Russian territory or even from sending forces into Russia’s Kursk Oblast, it has deterred Ukraine’s allies from providing the support Ukraine truly needs to expel Russian forces. There is little reason to believe this dynamic would change in the future.
NATO membership for Ukraine is unlikely in any realistic short-term scenario, primarily because too many member states — starting with the U.S. — oppose it. Under a Trump administration, it is highly improbable that the U.S. would extend its nuclear umbrella to Ukraine as it does for South Korea and Japan.
Discussions about any shared dimension of the U.K.’s nuclear deterrent are nonexistent. France’s nuclear deterrence is limited to its own vital interests, and debates — dating back to French General Charles de Gaulle — continue over whether those interests extend beyond France’s borders. While Macron has revived these discussions, France’s political turmoil makes any significant changes to its nuclear doctrine highly unlikely in the near term.
If Ukraine were to pursue nuclear capabilities, it could only do so outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), fundamentally rewriting the world’s nuclear rulebook. Such a move would likely make the world even more dangerous.
At a recent conference at Chatham House in London, veteran Russia expert Keir Giles, author of “Who Will Defend Europe?”, offered a simple answer when asked what could secure Ukraine: the strategic defeat and deterrence of Russia.
Which brings us back to negotiations. Any deal that fails to deter Russia from attacking its neighbors again will collapse, as previous agreements with Russia always have.
Albert Einstein, often credited as the father of the nuclear bomb, is alleged to have said, “The definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.”
Let’s hope that those entering the seemingly inevitable negotiations with the world’s chief nuclear blackmailer keep those words in mind — and that they stop setting red lines where the only red is the blood of those who have died because of them.
Editor’s Note: The opinions expressed in the op-ed section are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Kyiv Independent.
Jason Blevins
