Editor's note: We asked members of the Kyiv Independent community to share the questions they have about the war. Here's what they asked and how we answered. Join our community to ask a question in the next round. Our community funds our journalism.
Question: I know it's a big question, but how long do you think Ukraine can continue, realistically, to hold out?
Answer: It is indeed a big question that cannot be answered simply. Ukraine's manpower problem is well-known, and with the increased strain of mobilization on society over 2024, it is getting harder and harder to fix in a timely manner. On top of bringing more people in, more needs to be done to better use and protect the infantry currently serving: through better training, equipment, fortifications, use of drones, and command decisions.
Until then, the overstretched state of the Ukrainian army is what leads to these larger and larger weak points that can be exploited by Russia and turned into faster territorial gains.
But even more important for the answer to your question is the Russian side: how long they can sustain this intensity of offensive operations and the respective losses they are taking. It's impossible to give a definitive answer to, and the Russians can always turn to larger-scale forced mobilization of their own, or expand the North Korean contingent. There are signs on the horizon that they can't go on for too much longer, from the economy to an unsustainable rate of armored vehicle losses, but when Moscow's tactic of choice remains just throwing bodies at the problem, I wouldn't count on it. — Francis Farrell, reporter
Question: Everybody wants to see an end to the conflict, but I think Putin wants to continue. I am sure he wants to erase the sovereign nation Ukraine from the world map. In light of this, why has President Zelensky made a statement suggesting a freeze in current front lines and ceding temporarily-occupied land to Russia? They hope to negotiate a return of land to Ukraine later. This seems to me to be a forlorn act.
Answer: I recently wrote an analysis looking exactly at all these scenarios, which goes into a lot more detail than I can here. Zelensky is not pushing for a simple freezing of the war, much the opposite, he is making the strong and true case that Ukraine cannot agree to a simple ceasefire without hard deterrence against a repeat Russian invasion, of which only NATO membership really works as a rock-solid guarantee. The point is, that with the battlefield taking a turn for the worse for Ukraine over this year, and with an incoming Trump administration pretty clear on how they plan to scale back aid or end it completely, Zelensky's options are few. — Francis Farrell, reporter
Question: Are we now at the point where ground troops from Ukraine's allies are needed to finish this war? What are the politics concerning this issue within the EU and with other allies of Ukraine? And could the process of providing on the ground support at least be started with trainers, maintainers and logistical support? What is known about possible direct allied involvement in the war?
Answer: Yes, in the absence of NATO membership, the deployment of European boots on the ground could serve as a strong deterrent to a future Russian invasion. Sometimes people call it the Korean scenario. It could be anything from air defense, to training, the placement of a missile deterrence manned by foreigners, or troops deployed into a demilitarized zone along the contact line (this one is unlikely, in my opinion). The point here is not only the physical protection that they could provide, but the show of strength to Russia: Europe is standing up to Moscow, and they are embracing Ukraine in its security architecture for the long term.
Now, that all sounds great, but the problem is in the implementation. Discussions have certainly begun between some European states, but turning them into action seems to still be a long way to go, and Ukraine might not have that much time. Of course, there is also a big difference in the circumstances under which this could happen: a) as part of a finished peace plan agreed upon by everyone and backed by Trump (unlikely), b) needing to race to back up Ukraine's security after nothing more than a shaky ceasefire (more likely), or the most risky scenario, needing to come in and save Ukraine from a Russian leader that sees victory in his grasp and refuses to stop on the battlefield. — Francis Farrell, reporter
Asami Terajima
Question: Russia has made a lot of noise over U.S. and U.K. missiles being fired into Russia. Are the missiles that Russia is constantly firing into Ukraine all made in Russia?
Answer: No, Russia is not only firing Russian-made missiles into Ukraine. Since the end of 2023, it has also been hitting us with North Korean ballistic KN-23/24 missiles. They can fly over 400 miles and have attacked various parts of Ukraine, including Kyiv.
In the fall of 2024, Russia reportedly received Iranian ballistic Fath-360 missiles. They are of shorter range and pose the greatest threat to Ukrainian troops and equipment on the front line and in the near rear.
We should also not forget about Iranian Shahed drones, which Russia is using to attack the entire country. As you may have heard, Iran has transferred the technology for assembling these drones to Russia and supplies parts for their assembly. So Russia has made Iranian Shaheds one of the most massively used weapons in its war against Ukraine.
Finally, even Russian-made missiles contain imported components such as American chips or European heat and cold cameras. These are purchased by Russian intermediary companies, mostly from Chinese trading firms, and supplied to Russian missile manufacturers. Here’s our recent investigation about it. — Alisa Yurchenko, investigative reporter
Question: Is the Soviet Union's recreation Putin's ultimate goal? Is that why Russia attacked Ukraine?
Answer: Here I want to refer you to the weekly newsletter I write, "WTF is wrong with Russia?”, where I try to explain Russia and why it is the way it is.
In short, it’s complicated. Russian President Vladimir Putin doesn’t believe that the states that were part of the Soviet Union are independent. According to Putin, it’s “Russia’s backyard” and it is Russia that has the final say in how those states should act and what they should want.
Russians also don’t acknowledge the right for states like Ukraine and Belarus to have their own language and culture, basically denying reality.
Among them, Ukraine is the most important one to Russia. It defied Russia for years and Putin sees subjugating Kyiv as his ultimate prize. After so many defeats in Ukraine, it’s personal for him.
Additionally, Putin thinks that’s how the world works — if you are strong, you can do whatever you want. In Putin’s reality, the West had been unfair to Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union and had put Russia on its knees. Now, Russians are getting back at them.
That’s not true, and Russia had been bailed out by the West on multiple occasions, it was added to the G7 and was provided a seat at all important meetings, but that’s not how Russians see things now. — Oleksiy Sorokin, deputy chief editor
Question: Does Ukraine envisage the West not accepting Ukraine's NATO membership? If so, what guarantees would be valid for Ukraine to eventually accept peace with Russia?
Answer: President Volodymyr Zelensky had said on multiple occasions that NATO membership is the only security guarantee Kyiv will accept.
"(Ukraine) needs security guarantees, which we believe NATO membership offers most effectively,” he said.
However, NATO membership isn’t currently on the table for Ukraine and Kyiv is attempting to find alternative security guarantees that would help the country survive. Among them are deploying troops from European countries in Ukraine following a ceasefire.
Ukraine is "discussing ideas with European leaders" on the potential deployment of European peacekeeping forces to the embattled country, Zelensky told reporters during a press briefing in Brussels on Dec. 18.
Among the countries that were open to such an idea were France, Sweden, Poland, and the U.K.
All of these talks are still in their early stages and a top EU official told the Kyiv Independent said there are no discussions currently ongoing at the EU level on sending European troops to Ukraine to enforce a potential ceasefire. — Oleksiy Sorokin, deputy chief editor
Kollen Post
Question: I read about the possibility of letting Russia keep the oblasts they invaded in the last 10 years, and have Ukraine as a NATO member as a security measure. My question is, how do the Ukrainian people feel about this? Do you think it would be fair?
Answer: According to a poll published on Dec. 22, 47% of Ukrainians support joining NATO even if some of its territories remain under Russian occupation at the time of accession.
Ukrainians are exhausted and my understanding is that most people in the country would take the offer if it involves NATO membership and a ceasefire in which Ukraine doesn’t de jure acknowledge that part of the country is lost.
I see the desire to end the war, but I don’t see a possibility in which Ukraine signs an official peace treaty that gives five Ukrainian regions — Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts, and Crimea — to Russia. And since Moscow is aiming to have an official peace settlement where its territorial claims are satisfied, I don’t see how any agreement can be reached in the near future. — Oleksiy Sorokin, deputy chief editor
Question: People are still so afraid that any move Ukraine makes may be perceived as an escalation by Putin. However, everything Putin's forces do is an escalation. We so-called allies of Ukraine need to load up everything you need, no restrictions. Why are people so afraid of Russia?
Answer: Because Russian propaganda successfully sold the story of Russia being a big and strong country with nuclear weapons that it can use.
People in the West see Russia as the successor of the Soviet Union, which was a superpower of its time. The Soviet Union had far reach and it was a force that the United States had to reckon with.
Through their activity in Syria, Ukraine, Georgia and many European states, Russia is trying to show that they have the same clout. Many believe them.
This is also bolstered by Russian propaganda, which is one of Moscow’s most successful institutions.
Many people in the West are sold the idea that Russia is an eternal country, something that can’t be defeated.
Writers like Alexander Pushkin, Leo Tolstoy and Fyodor Dostoevsky are sold to show the magnitude of Russia’s culture through the ages, Napoleonic Wars and World War II are sold by propaganda to show that Moscow always wins.
Yet, Russia loses wars. In fact, it lost three of them in the past century — Russo-Japanese War, World War I and War in Afghanistan. Pushkin, Tolstoy, and Dostoevsky didn’t help them then. — Oleksiy Sorokin, deputy chief editor
Question: What is life like for the Ukrainians in the occupied areas? I hear it's pretty bad. What proportion of the Ukrainians really are Russian separatists? Aren't they getting bombed also? Do they support Putin? Why don't they just move to Russia, if that is what they prefer? Thanks for your response.
Answer: We recently released an investigative documentary about the system of terror that came with the Russian occupation: “Shadows Across the River.” It can give you a pretty good picture of what life is like for Ukrainians under occupation. Abductions, torture, and even killings are very common, to say the least.
Those who don’t leave the occupied territories aren’t automatically pro-Russian. They may have very diverse reasons to stay. One of them being that, following some twisted logic, Russians don’t let people through their checkpoints and borders if they find any indications of their pro-Ukrainian stance on their phones. — Danylo Mokryk, War Crimes Investigations Unit reporter
Question: What proportion of Ukrainians in occupied territories support Russia?
Answer: As for the proportion of pro-Russian people in the occupied territories, there really is no way to tell. We know that such people are there, of course. But no sociology is possible. The numbers published by the Russian government following their sham “referenda” are indicative of nothing at all. From what those who managed to flee the occupation tell us, pro-Russians are definitely a minority. — Danylo Mokryk, War Crimes Investigations Unit reporter
Question: What kind of rebuilding efforts have started in Ukraine?
Answer: Physical reconstruction hasn’t really started yet. There are a few examples such as Bucha and Irpin where homes, infrastructure, and businesses have been rebuilt after the occupation. But they are an anomaly, and for the most part, it is difficult to begin major reconstruction projects when Russia continues to bombard and occupy the country.
Ukraine has made preparations for reconstruction, namely with projects like the government’s DREAM system. This is an online database that contains all types of information on damaged buildings for reconstruction projects that allows citizens to monitor the process to ensure transparency.
While there is a lot of talk about reconstruction and lots of international events about how best to do it, in reality, it’s still a long way off.
In terms of economic recovery, GDP growth this year is forecasted at 4%, a major improvement compared to the precipitous 30% drop in 2022. There was also a minor resurgence in economic activity this year, bolstered by inflation control and GDP growth. Importantly, the last year saw one of Ukraine’s largest foreign investment deals in around a decade: the Datagroup-Volia-Lifecell merger. The total value of the deal was over $600 million. — Dominic Culverwell, business reporter
Question: Why has Ukraine been reluctant to reduce the draft age to 18?
Answer: Ukraine is unlikely to further lower the draft age to 18 for a few reasons, not least being the unpopularity of this idea among Ukrainians (both civilian and military). Kyiv has argued that its armed forces already suffer from a lack of equipment and weaponry, a situation made worse by delays in military aid from abroad. Zelensky argued recently that "the priority should be providing missiles and lowering Russia's military potential, not Ukraine's draft age." So, while a lower draft age would increase the number of available troops, there could be challenges in equipping them.
Another reason is simply Ukraine's demographic crisis, which has been exacerbated by Russia’s invasion. Ukraine's population has declined by over 10 million since Russia first invaded in 2014, and now has the lowest birthrate in Europe, with 30% of the population being pensioners. From Ukraine's perspective, sending young men to fight would therefore exacerbate this problem, as another cohort of men could be killed before they had the chance to have children.
We recently published an explanation on this topic that you can read here, or you can watch this video on the topic on our YouTube channel. — Elsa Court, audience engagement manager
Question: I have read that 2 million Ukrainians are avoiding military service. Is it possible to come to that conclusion, and what do we know about Ukrainians staying abroad to avoid service?
Any data on how many Ukrainians are avoiding military service would be either a speculation or an educated guess. It’s impossible to make a list of them, given logistic constraints and their wish not to be found. Even the total number of Ukrainian men eligible to fight is unclear, since the last country-wide census was held in 2001.
In my story about the Ukrainian government app Reserv+, where all military-aged men were required to update their data by July 17, the Defense Ministry data shows that 4.7 million people provided the info that would allow authorities to find them.
Meanwhile, the KI Insights chart in the story shows that there are estimated 9 million draft-aged men both in Ukraine and abroad.
Although only about 4.9 million are estimated to be draft-eligible, that means they would still have to update their data in the government app. We might speculate that the difference between those numbers — 9 million draft-aged men in total versus 4.7 million that updated their data — points to the scope of potential draft evaders.
However, it is a very rough calculation that doesn’t account for variables like people with no technical means to use the app or military-bound women that were also obliged to update their info. Also, among those who updated the info there can be the evaders who bribed doctors to obtain a fake disability certificate, which would make them not eligible for draft.
As for the Ukrainians staying abroad to avoid service, recently appointed Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha said in September that there are about 1 million military-aged Ukrainian men abroad. For comparison, a total number of Ukrainian refugees abroad is estimated at 6.8 million by the UN.
However, there is no information on how many of these men are fit for service, or have draft exemptions based on life circumstances and could be drafted upon return. Their reason for staying abroad could also be considered different from avoiding the draft. For instance, the pre-Russian full scale invasion U.N. report in 2021 estimated that 3 million Ukrainians lived abroad to work.
Sybiha added that the Ukrainian government collaborated with the Polish authorities to encourage some of the 300,000 draft-aged Ukrainian men in Poland to join the fight.
To sum it up, there is no definite way to calculate the numbers of men avoiding service, and I’m yet to find an educated guess that takes all the variables into account. — Natalia Yermak, reporter
Francis Farrell
Question: What efforts has the government taken to encourage military recruitment?
Answer: This year, the government made an unprecedented push to encourage military recruitment. It lowered the draft age from 27 to 25, developed Reserv+, an app to easily process the data of the draft-eligible men and obliged them to update their info on the app over a 60-day period. Experts said that it increased the mobilization rate at least twofold.
The government also introduced Army+, an app that is designed to gradually eliminate stifling bureaucracy. It is still limited in its functions, but the state’s effort to modernize the army is encouraging.
However, there are many things that the government didn't address to encourage recruitment this year.
For the Army+ story, KI Insights provided a chart showing people’s top concerns about joining the army. Some of them are hard to resolve, such as “fear of death or injury,” but others, like “not enough training prior to deployment” and “insufficient gear,” could be offset by better army management paired with adequate communication campaigns. — Natalia Yermak, reporter
Question: How can you travel to Ukraine? Since there are no commercial flights over the Ukrainian territory, is train the only way to access the country? Is there any train connection to the West other than via Lviv? How do Ukrainian authorities, including the president, travel overseas — also by train?
Answer: The train is the most popular way to get in and out of the country, but you can also drive and take the bus as well. Or, walking if you've got good legs. I walked across the Moldovan-Ukraine border earlier this year, and there were quite a few other people doing the same.
The most common entry point is from Poland, as trains from border towns like Przemyśl travel directly to Lviv and Kyiv. It can be a fun, albeit grueling half-day journey, or a full-day if you’re traveling from Warsaw or other bigger Polish cities since you have to swap trains at the border towns because of the size difference between Ukrainian and EU tracks. — Dominic Culverwell, business reporter
Question: When will Ukrainian airports reopen?
Ukraine is expecting to reopen at least one airport in the coming months. The airport is likely to be in Lviv due to its proximity to the EU border and its distance from the front line, according to Marsh McLennan Senior Partner Crispin Ellison, who is involved in the project. Ukraine needs to confirm air defenses around the airport to secure the insurance, but it could open by the end of January 2025, authorities claimed.
Ukrainian authorities usually travel by train, as do foreign officials. The state-run company Ukrzaliznytsia has special VIP cars equipped with a kitchen, conference room, and rather luxurious private bedrooms (compared to the shared civilian sleeping quarters). — Dominic Culverwell, business reporter
Question: How much does the Ukrainian military rely on Starlink? Do they have alternatives?
Answer: The Ukrainian military heavily relies on Starlink. Since turning on the cellular network near front-line areas is unsafe, whether at the base or in one of the dug-out positions, the Ukrainian military often uses Starlinks for internet access without putting themselves at risk.
Using Starlinks, the Ukrainian troops often communicate within themselves through Signal or WhatsApp, including operational information, and use mapping apps — as well as to stay in touch with their loved ones. Starlinks, however, are rarely available at the positions closest to Russian troops — there it is only radio communication or nothing. — Asami Terajima, reporter
Question: I would love to hear more about what it is like to report in Ukraine at or near the front lines. Do reporters sleep in abandoned buildings, treelines? What do they eat? Do they share meals with soldiers?
Answer: It depends on what period of the war we are talking about. For example, when I began reporting in the war-torn eastern Donbas in the winter of 2023, I often lived with the soldiers in their cottage-turned-military bases or stayed at hotels in one of the cities, such as Kramatorsk or Pokrovsk, near the front line.
If I am with the soldiers, they usually have a full-course meal that starts from salad to a can of porridge with pork, so I am always fed very well there. There are also restaurants and cafes working in these front-line cities and towns, so there are usually plenty of options.
But now, with Russian forces making significant advances in the Donbas and the intensity of the first-person view (FPV) drones attacks, journalists tend to go less to the front line itself, and most of the work is focused in the rear, where it is safe enough to conduct interviews.
Staying in hotels has proven to be extremely dangerous, especially after the two deadly missile strikes on the two major hotels in Donbas in 2023 and 2024, so journalists usually rent an apartment and stay in cities like Kramatorsk. In general, we try to limit the amount of time near the front line to reduce the chance of the unexpected. — Asami Terajima, reporter
Question: If Russia is allowed to keep the territory it currently occupies, how many Ukrainian citizens will be stuck under Russian occupation, especially young men? I ask because, though Russia has suffered excruciating casualties, I worry about young Ukrainians being drafted to fight their countrymen in the future.
Answer: The Ukrainian government says it’s about 6 million people overall, with 1.5 million of them being children. It’s hard to say how reliable the number really is.
According to Ukrainian military intelligence and to some people that we talk to, the draft of the Ukrainian men into the Russian army in the occupied territories is actually ongoing as we speak — which is a violation of international humanitarian law. — Danylo Mokryk, War Crimes Investigations Unit reporter
Question: Will returning the 19,000 Ukrainian children who were kidnapped in this war by Russia be part of the peace deal?
Answer: The return of the deported Ukrainian children is part of Zelensky’s Peace Formula, as well as several peace initiatives proposed by other states.
The Peace Formula encompasses the return of all deported children, prisoners of war, and Ukrainian civilians illegally detained by the Russian Federation.
Kateryna Rashevska, a Ukrainian lawyer specializing in the issues related to the deportation of children, says that the return of children is unlikely to become a subject of bargaining. Instead, what may be subject to negotiation is accountability for the deportation of Ukrainian children. The Rome Statute provides for such possibilities. Article 16 allows for the “suspension” of an investigation to facilitate the achievement of peace. This may be something Putin could request. — Olesia Bida, War Crimes Investigation Unit reporter
Question: Recently, the Kyiv Independent reported that of the approximately 200,000 people who fled Mariupol, as many as 70,000 have returned to the city, despite it being occupied and having been badly destroyed in 2022. How is this possible? What kind of life prospects can those people expect there?
Question: That number comes from a Ukrainian MP Maksym Tkachenko. In 24 hours, he withdrew his statement. Where did he get the number in the first place, remains a mystery. — Danylo Mokyrk, War Crimes Investigations Unit reporter
Question: What is the status of the big nuclear plant? Is it still occupied by Russian troops?
Answer: Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is still occupied by Russian troops. Much of what is happening at Europe’s largest nuclear power plant is unclear because Russian troops don’t allow Ukraine to access it. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been monitoring the situation on the ground. The Ukrainian Energy Ministry said in November that the plant was on the verge of a blackout after Russian attacks on power lines, adding that it is the second such incident in a week and such a “serious violation” threatens chances of accidents. — Asami Terajima, reporter
Question: How many Ukrainian civilians have been killed by hostile action since February 2022?
Answer: The short answer is we just don't know.
According to the UN, the civilian death toll since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion up until October 2024 is 11,973 civilians, including 622 children. But this comes with a massive caveat.
The UN's official reports usually add "the actual numbers are likely significantly higher," while almost buried towards the bottom in the methodology section, they elaborate and give an indication of just how much higher they likely are:
"The actual extent of civilian harm – both casualties and infrastructure damage – is likely considerably higher as many reports of civilian harm, particularly from the period immediately after the full-scale armed attack, have not been possible to verify due to the large number of reports and the lack of access to relevant areas.
"The number of civilian casualties is likely particularly undercounted in cities where there was protracted intensive fighting at the start of the armed attack in 2022 – such as Mariupol (Donetsk region), Lysychansk, Popasna, and Sievierodonetsk (Luhansk region)."
The U.N. figure of 11,973 civilians consists mostly of Ukrainian civilians who have died in either non-occupied areas of Ukraine — for example in Russian drone and missile attacks on cities — or in areas of occupied Ukraine that have since been liberated, Kherson for example.
This leaves a huge margin for error — many civilians killed in areas occupied since February 2022 and that remain occupied are not part of the official figures, as the U.N. has not been able to access these areas to verify the deaths.
Let's take Mariupol as an example, as it's very likely the place where civilian deaths have been the most underreported.
In correspondence with the U.N. officials who compiled the figures, they told me they had managed to verify around 2,100 civilian deaths in the city.
But they added: "However, the actual number of civilians killed is likely significantly higher because there are reports that we have not yet been able to verify, but also because there are likely deaths that we have not received any information about at all."
So how much higher could the numbers be? Again, it's impossible to say for certain but we do have some clues.
An estimate by Human Rights Watch based on satellite images of mass graves said at least 8,000 civilians died during the battle for the city, but again said the true figure was likely significantly higher.
Other sources and unconfirmed reports paint an even grimmer picture. And these figures don't include those who will have died since from the conditions imposed by Russian occupation in a destroyed city with little functioning infrastructure.
While the death toll in Mariupol is likely one of the highest, the same reasoning must be applied to all the other towns, cities, and villages still under Russian occupation.
So, while we can't say for certain, we can be sure the total number of Ukrainian civilians killed by Russia since February 2022 is far higher than the official number of 11,973. — Chris York, news editor
Question: Has the Black Sea been cleaned from Russian ships? Are the alternatives for grain exports over West European ports used?
Answer: Russia’s Black Sea fleet is still present, although depleted by Ukrainian attacks. Many of the ships have retreated from occupied-Crimea to the eastern end of the sea, stationed around the city of Novorossiysk in Krasnodar Krai. Russia is also constructing a naval base in Abkhazia, a Russian-occupied region of Georgia.
Ukraine continues to export its grain through the Black Sea via a corridor it carved out in August 2023 after Russia dropped out of the grain agreement. But grain export is fraught with danger and Russia has damaged over 320 port infrastructure facilities as well as 20 foreign merchant vessels in the Black Sea since July 2023, President Volodymyr Zelensky said last month. — Dominic Culverwell, business reporter
Question: As an independent newsroom, how do you see yourselves developing while there is a war on?
Answer: The Kyiv Independent was set up just a few months before the full-scale invasion, in November 2021. Since Feb. 24, 2022 we’ve grown from 18 people to 65, launched multiple products and services — including the War Crimes Investigation Unit, newsletters, anti-corruption investigations, and our own e-store — published several books and have gone through quite a few operational transformations. It has been challenging, but it has also been the only reality we know as a company.
Being a bridge between Ukraine and the world, we have had to become bigger and better every day. While the war is on — and probably even more so after it ends — our mission is crucial for Ukraine’s survival and well-being.
As we are looking into the uncertainty of 2025, we are planning for a few scenarios, including a ceasefire that won’t be beneficial for Ukraine, a nuclear strike, Ukraine's victory, and reintegration of territories — as well as a few others.
But whatever happens, we will be staying on our mission, we will keep finding new and engaging ways to tell the story of Ukraine and the region, both editorially and through other media. And we will do our best to stay in touch with the needs of our audience and our community. After all, our strategies will always be driven by you. — Daryna Shevchenko, CEO
Question: Is there any tourism going on in Ukraine presently? In particular, in areas where the war seems a bit more distant — for example, Lviv?
Answer: There is! I wrote a story in February about war tourism in Ukraine. There are a few international tourists coming to Ukraine purely for a vacation but it's pretty small. Domestic tourism, however, has skyrocketed particularly in western regions. Since men can't travel, many go on holiday to resorts in the mountains or city trips to places like Chernivtsi and Lviv. — Dominic Culverwell, business reporter
Question: I'm still wondering how Russia can be on the U.N. Security Council after everything it has done. Who needs to be putting pressure on the U.N. to either update or disband the Council?
Answer: Unfortunately, there are currently no feasible legal pathways to remove Russia from the U.N. Security Council, as the U.N. Charter does not allow the removal of a permanent member.
This is a deliberate feature, rather than a bug — the U.N. Security Council’s permanent members are based on World War II victors who wanted to ensure that the international body could not be used against them or their interests.
A reform of a U.N. Security Council or its veto right (by changing the U.N. Charter) is also difficult, as it would require ratification by all five permanent members, as well as two-thirds of the General Assembly. It would effectively require Russia to vote against itself, not to mention China would have to vote against its ally. — Martin Fornusek, senior news editor
Question: Ukraine denuclearized in exchange for security guarantees. Why didn't they work? Does this invasion show that nuclear armament is the only effective guarantee?
Answer: The problem with the Budapest Memorandum, under which Ukraine gave up on its nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees in 1994, was that the document left it unclear whether it was simply a political agreement or a legally binding treaty. It did not provide guarantees strong enough to compel the Western signatories to step in when Russia launched its invasion.
While the Soviet-era nuclear weapons may have provided some kind of deterrence for Ukraine — though their possible usefulness is still debated by experts — it doesn’t mean they are the only possible security guarantee for Ukraine. NATO, along with Article 5 and the U.S. nuclear umbrella, is the most effective way to deter Russian aggression without Ukraine investing resources into developing and/or maintaining a limited nuclear arsenal. — Martin Fornusek, senior news editor
Question: Can you summarize how Ukraine is doing in its fight against government corruption?
In short, I would say, it’s not great but not horrible.
It’s important to remember that Ukraine has been on a long path to battle corruption since 2014, when the people of Ukraine overthrew a corrupt pro-Russian leadership, and the country took on a path of reforms. Anti-corruption infrastructure was created in the following few years, which included several agencies for prevention, investigation and prosecution of corruption. It wasn’t an easy path. At every turn, people in power tried to sabotage or control it. It turns out, the idea of a truly independent anti-corruption infrastructure doesn’t sit well with presidents and their staff.
The war has been a setback. Martial law, classified defense procurement and draft evasion schemes are all ample grounds for corruption. While so many Ukrainians are making sacrifices to contribute to the victory, there are bad actors who see the war as an opportunity to make quick money.
Ukrainian government hasn’t made fighting corruption a priority, claiming that it’s focusing fully on winning the war. In reality, corruption is an internal enemy that is undermining Ukraine in its fight against Russia. It has undoubtedly affected Ukraine’s capacity to defend itself. Corruption in draft offices has left Ukrainian front-line units without manpower, and high-level procurement corruption has left them with fewer supplies than they need.
The good news is, I don’t think that the Ukrainian society’s demand for ending corruption has gone down at all. I hope that if anything, it’s going to be sharper after the war ends. Ukrainian people know, through the past revolutions, how to press demands in the way that they can’t be ignored. — Olga Rudenko, editor-in-chief
Question: Since the beginning of the full-scale war, what steps, if any, have been taken to reduce the very high level of corruption that was present in Ukraine before the war started?
Answer: In a nutshell, while progress has been made, there have also been setbacks in the reform process.
A new chief anti-corruption prosecutor, Oleksandr Klymenko, has been chosen after his predecessor, Nazar Kholodnytsky, got caught in a corruption scandal and discredited the anti-corruption prosecutor's office. Klymenko's record so far is better than Kholodnytsky's.
As part of judicial reform, the two judicial governing bodies have been re-launched. However, this reform turned out to be controversial since selection commissions rejected many candidates with a good reputation and approved discredited and tainted candidates for top judicial jobs.
One of those judicial governing bodies, the High Qualification Commission, has re-launched the vetting of judges and approved firing some of the most controversial ones. At the same time, the commission has also greenlighted most judges whom the Public Integrity Council, the state-sanctioned civil society watchdog overseeing judicial reform, considers to be violators of ethics and integrity standards.
Another judicial governing body, the High Council of Justice, has made a preliminary decision to fire Pavlo Vovk, Ukraine's most controversial judge involved in many corruption scandals. The council has yet to make a final decision on Vovk.
Before that, parliament had passed a law to liquidate Vovk's Kyiv District Administrative Court. — Oleg Sukhov, reporter
