It's no secret that U.S. officials have been trying to drive a wedge between Russia and its key ally, China.
Former United States Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia Keith Kellogg was among the government officials who made the intention public, saying that the U.S. would try to "break (Vladimir) Putin's alliances."
Kellogg was later demoted, with the word Russia removed from his job title.
U.S. State Secretary Marco Rubio echoed Kellogg's sentiment, saying that having a relationship with Russia would allow Moscow to be less dependent on China. Yet, the state secretary was a bit more realistic in his expectations.
"I don't know if we'll ever be successful completely at peeling them off of a relationship with the Chinese," Rubio told far-right Breitbart News on Feb. 25.
Dubbed the "reverse Kissinger" (or reverse Nixon), experts say the strategy envisions the U.S. playing on tensions between Moscow and Beijing. They also say it's a fundamentally flawed approach.
For Russia and China, international law is "built in an unfair way, excluding China, Russia and other countries from decision-making on the international arena," Temur Umarov, a research fellow at the Berlin-based Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, told the Kyiv Independent.
"They think this system should be reformed, and they see themselves as alternative centers to Washington."
This relationship is a "match made in heaven," he added.
Oleg Sukhov
A fundamentally flawed strategy
Decades ago, the United States embarked on a charm offensive in an attempt to capitalize on the Sino-Soviet split. Then President Richard Nixon's photogenic 1972 visit to China featured the U.S. leader exchanging warm smiles with Chinese tyrant Mao Zedong.
This visit was far more than pictures.
Spearheaded by then-State Secretary Henry Kissinger, these contacts helped warm relations between the U.S. and China, leaving the USSR isolated in the face of the new Chinese-American friendship.
Fast forward to 2025, the question asked by experts worldwide is whether Donald Trump is trying to repeat Nixon's 1970s experiment the other way around — pulling a weaker Russia away from a much more powerful China.
The answer to that question, for now, is a flat no.
Five decades ago, the USSR and China were in the middle of a major split, culminating in armed combat across their border on the Amur River. In 2025, Russia and China show no signs of wanting to loosen their friendship.
A 'match made in heaven' with few weak spots
Like any relationship, the Chinese-Russian one is not perfect. One point of divergence, according to Brookings Institution researcher Patricia Kim, who spoke with the Kyiv Independent, is Russia's increasingly warm relations with North Korea.
"(Pyongyang) is providing lethal assistance to Russia in its war against Ukraine in return for military technology assistance, which makes China nervous," Kim explained.
Kim added that Beijing was also interested in acting as an intermediary in negotiations on the war in Ukraine, so direct contacts between Russia and the U.S. make China worried about being sidelined in the process.
Links between Moscow and Beijing are, however, much stronger than any potential disagreements that the two sides could have. Beyond their anti-Western ideologies, Beijing and Moscow are strongly linked to one another through their economies, with Russia exporting oil, gas, and timber in exchange for Chinese manufactured goods.
This interdependency grew especially after the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine when the EU introduced sanctions on Russian gas. Three years on, the EU market remains closed, making Beijing one of the few major clients still available.
"China appears satisfied with this arrangement," according to Callum Fraser, a research fellow at the London-based think tank RUSI, who spoke to the Kyiv Independent. "In fact, Beijing can take advantage of Russia's vulnerable position and negotiate discounts on gas," Fraser explained.
As a result, China came to be the dominant player in this economic relationship, buying "as much gas as it needs," according to Fraser, but refusing Moscow's advances to sell more. Chinese leader Xi Jinping, for instance, did not agree to Putin's proposal to build a second leg of the existing Power of Siberia gas pipeline, which links the two countries.
Russian-Chinese cooperation does not end with gas and oil exports.
"China's military industry is based on Soviet-era technologies, and what Russia can provide is something which just fits into China's own military complex," Umarov told the Kyiv Independent.
Aside from weapons exports, Russia has other technologies inherited from the Soviet Union, such as its nuclear industry. Prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia "didn't really want to share this know-how (with China), but now (Moscow) doesn't really have any other options" due to its international isolation, Umarov explained.
Above the material component, the Russian-Chinese relationship is "driven by Beijing and Moscow's shared antipathy towards a 'Western-dominated' global order," Kim argued in turn.
Chris York
What does Trump want, and can he achieve it?
For now, it's "very unclear" what the Trump administration wants to achieve with regards to Russia, Fraser explained to the Kyiv Independent. "Trump wants to get a ceasefire in Ukraine, and he wants to capitalize on the strong relationship which he claims to have with Vladimir Putin, in order to make trade deals."
In any case, any policy to weaken China is well perceived by the new U.S. administration, and warming relations with Russia is just one of the possible steps in this field, Fraser added.
"President Trump clearly sees himself as the ultimate negotiator, and he's made it clear that he wants to strike deals with both Moscow and Beijing," Kim said. "But he has yet to articulate clear views on what precisely he hopes to achieve by talking with both."
The issue with this approach is that China and Russia will not stop perceiving the U.S. as a threat anytime soon, regardless of Trump's views on NATO and American allies in Asia, Kim said. This means that the China-Russia partnership isn't likely to weaken anytime soon, as both sides see too much value in being close to one another.
"Moscow doesn't want to be seen as sacrificing its relationship with China for the sake of being closer to the United States," Umarov said. "For Moscow, this relationship is a strategic interest, and there are many reasons why it's just unimaginable for Russia to turn its back on China."
Structural problems in the U.S.-Russia relationship also make it hard to imagine the two countries seriously warming relations. The U.S. simply does not have any strategic, economic, military or political advantages to hand to Russia, at least in comparison with what China can offer, Fraser explained.
One reason for this is that, unlike China, the U.S. does not need Russia's fossil fuel and other raw materials exports, as it can rely on its own reserves.
"None of this is going to disappear just because Donald Trump is posting something which seems to be sympathetic or supportive of Russia's current interests in Ukraine," Umarov argued.
Whatever the war's outcome, the success of an American "reverse Kissinger" strategy is doubtful. "People who are putting these thoughts into policy in the U.S. don't understand the current nature of the relationship between Moscow and Beijing," he added.
Oleg Sukhov
