Sitting on NATO's eastern frontier, Lithuania has been punching above its weight when it comes to aiding Ukraine.
Ranked among the top military donors in terms of GDP per capita, the country of 2.8 million has provided Ukraine with helicopters, drones, armored vehicles, and air defenses, not to mention extensive humanitarian support. Vilnius has also pledged to allocate at least 0.25% of its yearly GDP to boost Kyiv's defense capabilities.
This resolute support is not without cause. Sharing Ukraine's history of subjugation by Russia and sandwiched between the heavily armed exclave of Kaliningrad and Moscow's ally Belarus, Lithuanian leaders understand that freedom and sovereignty can be lost.
Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis has been one of the most vocal voices among Western top officials, calling for more decisive support for Ukraine and warning against Russian expansionism.
The Kyiv Independent sat down with Minister Landsbergis at the Globsec forum in Prague on Aug. 30 to discuss how to finally win the war.
The Kyiv Independent: Despite Western support, fighting in Ukraine has been ongoing for two and a half years. What needs to change in the mindset and strategy of Western partners if they want to help Ukraine win?
Gabrielius Landsbergis: First of all, we have to get rid of the fear. I think that fear was the main constricting element for us to support Ukraine to victory. And the fear has several elements. The biggest element is the fear that Russia's military capability would be tested (against us) if it considers certain elements of our support as an escalation.
" I think that fear was the main constricting element for us to support Ukraine to victory"
The second fear is what happens if Russia is defeated. And those two fears combined, they created such a dilemma for Western allies that they were unable to assist Ukraine to the fullest.
And, of course, we usually tend to say that what we did is unprecedented. And in many cases, it is. The European Union has issued a number of defense support packages, which has never happened in the past, (they have issued) sanctions, and so on.
But it's best to start with a certain strategy and goal rather than just taking it step by step. Without the strategy, without the goal, it's difficult to say whether we have helped enough. But for those who know what should have been done, it's easier.
The Kyiv Independent: You touched on this subject earlier today during the forum, saying that we need to clearly define our goals. How would you define Ukraine's victory?
Gabrielius Landsbergis: Ukraine is safe and secure within its own internationally recognized borders and is part of the EU and NATO.
The Kyiv Independent: Do you think that this definition is shifting among some Western partners? Are some, perhaps, growing more open to compromises, such as territorial concessions?
Gabrielius Landsbergis: I think that we should have learned about territorial concessions in 1938. Where did it lead us, and how much did it cost? It did not change the dictator. It just weakened us in his eyes.
The only strategy for negotiations has to come from Kyiv, and we have to do everything we can to make Kyiv as strong as possible so that whenever something is decided, Ukraine is in the strongest position.
And the word itself, "negotiations" – somebody might say that there was a diplomatic settlement between Japan and the United States on the USS Missouri.
But the content of the settlement was unconditional surrender. Almost every conflict has a diplomatic settlement at the end. But if you have in mind concessions that allow Russia to keep land and continue the pressure on Ukraine, then it's not a negotiation, it's a surrender.
Francis Farrell
The Kyiv Independent: In a surprise turn earlier this month, Ukrainian troops crossed into Russian territory in Kursk Oblast. What do you think are the main implications of Ukraine's incursion into Russia?
Gabrielius Landsbergis: I call it a strategic dilemma. Within international law, it is Ukraine's right. But from the military perspective, it is also a smart strategy.
The strategy that we applied so far – by "we" I mean the Western allies – was of strategic clarity. We declared everything.
I joked during the the panel that (Russian President Vladimir) Putin doesn't even need spies, he can just open a newspaper and read what is (happening), where we are.
Much of this transparency is because that's the way that we decided to manage escalation. If (Putin) knows, then there's less room for mistake. But you cannot wage war in this sort of transparency.
So when (French) President Emmanuel Macron started speaking about putting French troops or French trainers in Ukraine, we supported it wholeheartedly.
Lithuania was one of the first countries to support this because similarly, Putin doesn't know what will happen next. That's a better way to win the war, rather than transparency.
The Kyiv Independent: There has been criticism that Europe was caught off guard by the war in terms of its own defense production, military readiness, or the speed at which it was helping Ukraine. Has there been an improvement, or do these problems persist?
Gabrielius Landsbergis: The first part of my answer is that if we're talking about the black swans, it's impossible to call 2022 a black swan.
You would have to live under a rock, on a different planet, to call (the full-scale war) a black swan. Everybody who understands geopolitics, who knows Russia, knew that this would happen.
There wasn't a single surprised person in the Baltics. We were shocked by the ferocity of it, but not surprised. I wouldn't even say (we were surprised) in 2014 because after 2008, when (Putin) crossed the border into Georgia, he showed that he could and was ready to do it.
And there was no price paid for it. We were caught off guard because we chose to be caught off guard.
Now I see a change. Today, we listened to the president of the (European) Commission speak. European leaders have never spoken like this about defending Europe, spending more on defense, and having the military industry reestablished and strengthened.
My only question is, how much time do we have? And how much time is Ukraine buying us? Because this is what is happening, and I hope that it's enough.
You see quite a lot of change in the Baltics. We are trying to convince our people to spend more on defense, to build up factories, to cooperate more with Ukraine, and to learn everything that we can because we feel that if Ukraine is unable to stop the Russians, then the Russians will not stop, and then who knows what will happen next?
But honestly, I don't feel this urgency the further you go from the eastern frontier. Different timeline, different calendar.
The Kyiv Independent: Do you believe that open confrontation between NATO and Russia is possible? And if yes, is NATO ready for that?
Gabrielius Landsbergis: It is possible. (But) we have to remember that NATO is a defensive alliance, and it would be Russia's choice to try that.
When we add up the number of troops, missiles, tanks, and money, Russia is nowhere near the power that it was during the Soviet Union when it could match NATO. In real military scenarios, it's incomparable. NATO could overwhelm Russia.
But the Russians are not counting on that. They are counting on – how they explain it to themselves – democratic weakness, inability to make decisions, differences in opinions.
And this is what we're seeing: so many decisions in the EU have been blocked by a single country.
We have this history: we had a common country with Poland, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, for hundreds of years.
It was dismantled by great powers at the end of the 18th century. One of the reasons why it happened was that in the parliament, decisions could only be made by an unanimous vote. So the only thing that the Russians needed to do was to buy off a couple of members of parliament.
The (Polish-Lithuanian) union, which was territorially probably the largest entity in Europe, could not defend itself because we did not have an army that was ready to fight. Why? Because there were people who were "for peace, not for war."
It's good to remember these history lessons. I think that the Russians read history.
The Kyiv Independent: Since Lithuania borders Belarus, how do you perceive the recent troop movement and the rising tensions on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border?
Gabrielius Landsbergis: (Belarusian dictator Alexander) Lukashenko has always acted within a very limited scope of independence and sovereignty. Putin draws with chalk where (Lukashenko) can move, what he needs to do.
There's a clear pressure on (Lukashenko) to move the troops to the Ukrainian border, and this is what he's doing. (But) I don't think that he's really willing to participate (in the war).
The Ukrainian army, with everything that the Ukrainian people have faced, is the strongest army that you have.
I don't think that Belarus would be ready to try. You understand what it means to take on seasoned Ukrainian soldiers who have been waging war for almost three years.
But (Lukashenko's) troops being there just reminds us that he is an extension of Putin's arm.
Note from the author:
Hi, this is Martin Fornusek. I hope you enjoyed this interview.
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Maria Yeryoma
