Freedom of speech in 2026: Between Brussels' demands and the realities of war
A journalist looks at a damaged house after a Russian drone attack on Jan. 22, 2025, in Sumy, Ukraine. (Denys Kryvopyshyn/ Cukr.city /Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images)
Yaroslav Yurchyshyn
Member of Ukrainian Parliament
About the author: Yaroslav Yurchyshyn is a Ukrainian MP and chair of the parliamentary Committee on Freedom of Speech.
For Ukraine's media environment, 2026 is set to be an intense year — no less demanding than 2025.
In December, the president signed the law opening parliamentary committees to the public, which significantly eases the work of journalists and civil society actors by introducing online broadcasts, open meetings, and advance access to agendas. These changes also apply to local self-government.
In 2026, Ukraine will most likely remain in a mode where the war must be covered to the maximum extent possible. At the same time, important changes in media law will be required as part of the country's path toward EU accession.
The most urgent priority for 2026 remains the release of journalists held in Russian captivity. The status of a journalist in captivity is a particularly complex category, as Russia often tries to charge them with "espionage" or "terrorism" in order to exclude journalists from prisoner exchange processes and subject them to actual criminal sentences.
In reality, this is simply the use of coercive mechanisms to demonstrate that freedom of speech is impossible when it comes to opposing the Kremlin.
According to the Institute of Mass Information, 26 civilian media workers are currently being illegally held in Russian captivity. These are people who found themselves under occupation after 2022, as well as, for example, Crimean Tatars who lived on their own land after the annexation of Crimea but posed a threat to the regime simply because they told the world the truth.
The most painful blow for us was the death of journalist Viktoriia Roshchyna in captivity in 2024. We were only able to say goodbye to her in 2025 because Russia delayed the transfer of her body. Viktoriia's body was so badly tortured that it was registered as male.
To understand what a Russian prison really is, I recommend reading the Viktoriia Project. Bringing our people back from captivity has always been my top priority, but after this investigation, it became even more so. It is horrifying, repulsive, and hateful all at once.
I became chair of the parliamentary committee on freedom of speech at the end of 2023.
Since then, through joint efforts, we have managed to bring back several media workers. In 2024, four were released: Nariman Dzhelyal, Maksym Butkevych, Roman Borshch, and Oleksandr Hudilin. In 2025, four more journalists returned home: Vladyslav Yesypenko, Dmytro Khilyuk, Mark Kaliush, and Volodymyr Chertushkin.
It is difficult to predict what the coming year will bring, as prisoner exchanges depend on factors far beyond Ukraine's control. Russia treats journalists as military personnel, which only complicates matters.
Still, as in 2024 and 2025, the return of journalists from captivity will remain the central freedom-of-speech priority in 2026. We are enlisting the support of all possible partners — Reporters Without Borders, governments and parliaments of democratic states, and the parliamentary assemblies of the OSCE and NATO — and working to ensure that every single person comes home.
Ukraine is also moving toward the introduction of anti-SLAPP legislation, aimed at countering Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation. SLAPP cases are essentially baseless lawsuits used to intimidate investigative journalists by burdening them with legal costs.
Court expenses can run into absurd sums, which is a real problem for media outlets today. Instead of focusing on quality journalism, media professionals are forced to think about financial threats hanging over them. Ukraine has already begun implementing the EU's anti-SLAPP directive and will continue this work in the coming year.
We have set up a working group bringing together civil society organisations, government representatives, and international partners. One lesson from consultations on European platforms is that anti-SLAPP laws are difficult to implement everywhere, not only in Ukraine, because such lawsuits are most often initiated by those who hold power. Nevertheless, Ukraine continues to follow the recommendations of the European Union and the Council of Europe.
For Ukraine, this process must continue in 2026, as it is part of our obligations on the path to European integration.
Ukrainian legislation must clearly define what constitutes a SLAPP lawsuit in domestic conditions, while remaining fully aligned with European standards. This includes adapting a national law in line with the European Media Freedom Act. While a comprehensive legal framework is still lacking, the Ukrainian Law on Media already provides a foundation on which further reforms can be built.
The latest European Commission report on Ukraine's progress noted a high level of legislative adaptation, particularly with regard to the Law on Media.
However, in 2026, Brussels will expect answers to other concerns. One of them is the state-sponsored telethon. The European Commission recommends a gradual exit from this broadcasting format and would like to see it transformed into a stable public service broadcasting model, with competition among private media groups restored.
This is critically important for democracy and freedom of expression, regardless of political affiliation.
Another key issue is financial independence. In 2026, it is crucial to ensure full funding for the public broadcaster in order to avoid political dependence. I fully support this idea and have repeatedly submitted amendments to the budget to strengthen our national broadcaster.
Unfortunately, not everyone shares this view.
Transparency of ownership is also essential, including further digitalisation of media ownership registers so that society can clearly see who stands behind each online outlet or Telegram channel.
Moreover, the fight against Russian influence is entering a new phase. Direct propaganda channels have been blocked, but hidden threats and so-called "useful idiots" remain.
A particular case is animated content as a tool of ideological influence. The cartoon Masha and the Bear has long been recognised by Western security experts, including in the Baltic states, as an element of Russia's soft power.
The studio that owns the rights to the cartoon is registered in Russia, and its owners are Russian businessmen who pay taxes that finance the war. Sanctions should be imposed on the studio's owners, and this Russian product should be fully blocked on all possible platforms, even if it is dubbed into Ukrainian.
At the same time, there are still highly questionable media figures in Ukraine's information space whose narratives echo Russian propaganda, or whose programmes host guests promoting hostile interests.
We will work on each case individually and, I hope, will be able to bring good news about blocking certain pages and accounts that assist Russia. Ideally, this should lead to full accountability for crimes committed in the information war. There are still people who feel completely at ease after years of disinforming hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians and being paid by Russia.
In 2026, we will continue working to free journalists from Russian captivity, protect the rights of media professionals, and support free media. This is the foundation of Ukrainian democracy on its path toward the European Union.
Editor's note: Copyright, Ukrainska Pravda. This translated article has been republished by the Kyiv Independent with permission. The opinions expressed in the op-ed section are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the views of the Kyiv Independent.
