It ended with a bang, not a whimper. By the close of this year’s Munich Security Conference, the old U.S.-led security order appeared to have changed unrecognizably. Now, as Russia’s full-scale war enters its fourth year and peace talks begin, without clarity on Europe’s or Ukraine’s roles, both should adjust to their new strategic reality. If it wants lasting peace on the continent, Europe must finally take responsibility for its own security – starting in Ukraine.
The outcome of peace talks (they are not negotiations until Ukraine is in the room) depends on battlefield expectations. Russia has little reason to keep its promises if it believes it has a fighting chance. Even after a settlement, Europe would remain permanently vulnerable to Russian aggression without credible deterrence. The best way to ensure lasting peace is to enable Ukraine to end the war on its own terms and keep the peace after it’s won.
Giving Ukraine the upper hand over Russia is less difficult than many expect. If Ukrainians have taught us anything, it’s that Russia can be beaten. Even with support from North Korea and Iran, Russia hasn’t yet managed to dislodge Ukrainians from Pokrovsk (in Ukraine) or Kursk Oblast (in Russia), and has been humiliated in Syria. All the while, it has suffered an estimated 850,000 casualties since its full-scale invasion.
A combination of military fragility and economic decline means that time is not on Russia’s side. Interest rates have soared to roughly 20% and inflation to 10%. Despite spending 30% of its budget on defense, Russia’s artillery advantage (a good proxy for military production capacity) has reportedly fallen from 10:1 in 2022 to 1.5:1. The unsustainable loss of manpower and machinery, for only small battlefield gains, suggests Russia is stretched to near its breaking point.
By comparison, the West is an economic behemoth. The combined GDP of countries that provided military aid to Ukraine was nearly $70 trillion in 2024, compared to roughly $2 trillion for Russia. Europe’s NATO members alone have over 10 times Russia’s GDP. However, despite its economic advantages, Russia has spent 40% more on destroying Ukraine than the combined West has spent defending it.
The only way for Europe to ensure its relevance is by investing in its own security in Ukraine. This is not a trade-off in the name of solidarity. It is rational self-interest. That’s because Ukraine is Europe: an investment in Ukraine’s defense is an investment in Europe’s defense. Emergency meetings in Paris last week suggested Europeans have received the message, though how much is “enough” is an open question.
New research from the Tony Blair Institute suggests that an additional $40 billion per year — just 0.2% of European GDP — would likely match Russia’s war spending and deliver Ukraine a battlefield advantage. This is no more expensive than other fiscal interventions, like those after the Global Financial Crisis and Covid-19. It’s also far cheaper than the likely alternatives: a new Cold War, or even a hot war in Europe.
To be sure, meaningful investment must be accompanied by ironclad, mutual security guarantees. But if wars are fought on the battlefield, they are won on the factory floor. Radically scaling up defense industrial capacity is crucial if Europe means to win. Ukraine can and should play a key role here: the country has mobilized its defense industry faster than any other in Europe. By following the Danish model of procuring equipment directly from Ukraine, for Ukrainians, Europe could achieve scale at lower cost while drawing on lessons from its most experienced military.
All wars end. Russia’s war in Ukraine will end too, but how it ends will determine whether it starts again. To ensure lasting peace, Europe must invest in its own security, and the best way is by defending Ukraine. It is vanishingly rare in world politics that right and wrong are so obvious. We should all find the courage to tell the difference.
Editor’s Note: The opinions expressed in the op-ed section are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the views of the Kyiv Independent.
Khusanboy Kotibjonov
