Russia-Iran alliance wavers as Tehran suffers major blows

Tehran, Russia's main ally in the Middle East, has been dealt a heavy blow as Israel dismantled its network of proxies and then struck targets in Iran.

The recent Iranian-Israeli war, which ended with a ceasefire on June 24, showed that the regional balance of power has shifted in Israel's favor.

This could have a major impact on Russian-Iranian relations as Moscow will have to recalibrate its approach to the region.

Russian-Iranian cooperation is likely to continue but Iran's ability to help Moscow is being diminished.

On the other hand, Russia, which is still heavily engaged in Ukraine, has few resources to spare for helping Iran.

"In public, Russian-Iranian relations will continue as business as usual," Neil Quilliam, a Middle East expert at Chatham House, told the Kyiv Independent.

"Behind closed doors, however, Iran's confidence in Russia has been undermined, and this no doubt will weaken the relationship. Tehran has learned to its cost that Russia is no longer a dependable ally.”

Margaryta Khvostova, a researcher focusing on international relations at the University of Surrey, also argued that "Russia's partnership with Iran appears increasingly unbalanced and is losing momentum."

Russian-Iranian cooperation

Russia has been Iran's primary arms supplier, selling air defense systems, helicopters, and fighter jets to Tehran.

However, "Iran’s reliance on Russian S-300 air defense systems, which reportedly failed to stop incoming Israeli missiles, further weakens the credibility of Russian military technology," Khvostova said.

"The evident lack of cohesion within the alliance, combined with an underwhelming defense performance, casts further doubt on the strength and reliability of Russia’s global posture," she added.

Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Iran has returned the favor by supplying Shahed combat drones to Moscow. Russia later licensed the technology and began producing the drones domestically.

Shaheds have been the main combat drones used by Russia to attack Ukrainian cities.

In 2024, the U.S. also confirmed that Iran had started supplying ballistic missiles to Russia, although there is no evidence so far of their use against Ukraine.

Khvostova told the Kyiv Independent that "early in the war against Ukraine, Iran played an important role by supplying Shahed-series drones, but since then, production has largely moved to Russian territory."

"This shift has reduced Iran’s leverage and limited its long-term strategic benefit," she added. "Promised deliveries of Iranian ballistic missiles have not materialized, and instead, Moscow has turned to North Korea for more substantial military support."

Karolina Hird, an analyst at the Institute for the Study of War, also told the Kyiv Independent that "Russia has indigenized so many of the capabilities it was so reliant on Iran for in the first few years of the war, the Shaheds being a huge example of that."

"So it's not clear to me that there would be a fundamental shift in Russia's ability to continue prosecuting its war in Ukraine if the regime changes in Iran," she added.

The Iranian regime, which is subject to international sanctions due to its nuclear weapons program, has also been able to survive due to economic cooperation with Russia and other non-Western countries such as China, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey.

In 2024, Russian-Iranian trade rose 16% year-on-year to $4.8 billion, making Russia Iran’s fifth-largest trading partner.

Strategic partnership deal

In January, Russia and Iran also concluded a 20-year strategic partnership agreement.

The deal envisages cooperation in the anti-terrorism, energy, financial, and cultural spheres. It also has clauses on technology, cybersecurity, and efforts to fight money laundering and organized crime.

According to the agreement, if one of the sides is attacked, the other side cannot provide military or any other help to the aggressor.

“I would say the agreements (between Russia and Iran) are substantive — as with all strategic partnerships they have their limits; they stop short of a mutual defense pact, which is why Russia was not obligated to provide military assistance to Iran,” Emily Ferris, a Russia expert at the Royal United Services Institute, told the Kyiv Independent.

She argued that “it was an important signal of long-term intent to deepen the relationship, particularly around trade” and “suggested that neither side saw Western sanctions being eased imminently.”

Can Russia help Iran?

As Russia is focused on its war against Ukraine, its ability to help Iran is very limited. The Kremlin condemned the Israeli and U.S. strikes on Iran but did not provide any material help.

"Russia is already overcommitted in Ukraine and does not have the military resources to spare to become embroiled in another conflict," Ferris said. "It did not give Iran air defense systems that could have moved the dial on the war in Iran's favor. Russia's offer of mediation was swiftly shot down by the Americans."

Quilliam also argued that "there is no evidence to suggest that Russia helped Iran in any material way during the war with Israel."

"Russia neither has the capacity to help nor the will to do so, given its experience in Syria, where it suffered a strategic loss," he added in a reference to the fall of dictator Bashar al Assad's regime in December 2024. "Should the war resume, it is unlikely that Russia will provide material aid to Iran, at least in the short term."

There are some ways in which Moscow is still able to help Iran, however.

"Iran will need diplomatic backing in the (UN) Security Council going forward, which Russia could provide," Aron Lund, a Middle East analyst at Century International, told the Kyiv Independent. "It will need help rebuilding its air defenses and its missile program. Whether Russia can afford to sell or share that kind of equipment is an open question."

He added that "military-industrial collaboration" between Iran and Russia is likely to continue.

Could Russia help Iran with nukes?

One of the areas where Russia and Iran have cooperated is the nuclear sector.

Israel's main military objective in Iran was the destruction of nuclear facilities.

The Israeli government justified the attacks by saying that Iran was on the verge of creating a nuclear bomb. The Israeli government has sought to prevent Tehran from obtaining nuclear weapons as Iranian leaders have repeatedly called for eliminating Israel.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said on June 12 that Iran was in breach of its nuclear non-proliferation obligations, although IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi said in a June interview he had no proof that Tehran was currently developing a nuclear weapon.

Robert Kelley, an engineer with over 35 years of experience in the U.S. Department of Energy’s nuclear weapons complex, said that Iran has the technological capacity to build a nuclear bomb and the only reason it has not done so is political.

"If Iran started, they could (build a nuclear bomb) in less than 18 months, probably much less," he told the Kyiv Independent. "Depends on how much they saved from the nuclear weapons program that ended in 2003 and how good their progress was. The U.S. built two different nuclear weapons designs in 18 months in the 1940s and there is a lot more to go on now."

There are different assessments of the damage caused by Israeli and U.S. strikes to Iranian nuclear facilities during the war.

Israel argued that it had caused significant damage to Iran's nuclear weapons program, while U.S. President Donald Trump claimed it had been "obliterated."

But CNN reported on June 24 that the U.S. strikes on three Iranian nuclear facilities had not eliminated the core components of Tehran’s nuclear program and had likely delayed it by only a few months. The news outlet cited a leaked assessment by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of the country's security council, said on June 22 that "a number of countries are ready to directly supply Iran with their own nuclear warheads" — a statement that some interpreted as a hint that Russia could help Iran to develop its nuclear weapons program.

On June 23, Trump lashed out at Medvedev.

“Did I hear former President Medvedev, from Russia, casually throwing around the ‘N word’ (nuclear!), and saying that he and other countries would supply nuclear warheads to Iran?" Trump wrote on Truth Social. "The 'N word' should not be treated so casually."

Medvedev responded the same day, arguing that Russia did not intend to supply Iran with nuclear weapons.

Nuclear non-proliferation

Russia has been Iran's main partner in the civilian nuclear sector. It has built Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant and supplied the facility with enriched uranium.

At the same time, Russia has presented itself as a supporter of nuclear non-proliferation and opposed Iran's nuclear weapons program.

In 2015, Russia — along with the U.S., China, France, the U.K. and Germany — signed a deal to limit the Iranian nuclear program in return for sanctions relief.

"So far, Russia has supported non-proliferation efforts in Iran," Marion Messmer, an arms control expert at Chatham House, told the Kyiv Indendent. "It doesn’t seem likely that a nuclear-armed Iran is in Russia’s interest — it would be disruptive in the Middle East, and it would give Iran more power when it’s likely that Russia prefers Iran to be the weaker party in the relationship."

Quilliam said that Russia "is unlikely to disrupt efforts to end Iran's nuclear program."

He added, however, that Moscow "may seek either to frustrate those efforts or come up with a creative diplomatic solution that serves its own interests, as it did with Syria’s chemical weapons issue."

Russia's regional influence

The relationship between Moscow and Tehran is also changing because the influence of both Russia and Iran in the Middle East has decreased since 2023 as Israel dealt heavy blows to Iranian proxies.

One of them, the Gaza-based Islamist group Hamas, invaded Israeli territory, massacred 1,195 people, and took 251 people hostage in October 2023. Hezbollah, Iran's Lebanese proxy, also joined the war.

Since then, Israel has killed Hamas and Hezbollah leaders, destroyed much of their military infrastructure and invaded Gaza and southern Lebanon.

Russia's clout further diminished when the regime of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, who was backed by Moscow and Tehran, collapsed in December 2024. Israel used the ensuing chaos to destroy the regime's military facilities and invaded southwestern Syria.

Furthermore, Israel's attacks on Iran in 2024 and 2025, which destroyed much of the country's air defense and damaged nuclear enrichment facilities, weakened the Iranian regime itself.

"Russia has seen its influence and ability to project power into the Middle East diminish since Oct. 7, 2023 and the collapse of the Assad regime," Quilliam said. "Regional players have come to view the U.S. as a dependable ally, but they have now come to view Russia as a liability."

Lund also argued that "Russia will need to take changed realities into account" amid the weakening of Iran and its allies.

"It’s possible that Russia will want to re-balance its Middle Eastern position over the longer term, if Iran starts looking like a resource drain that can’t offer much in return," he added. "The Iran ties have been positive for Russia, but they also come at a cost – especially in relation to Israel, but also among the Gulf Arab states."

Spoiled relations with US and Israel

Apart from the regional balance of power, the Israeli-Iranian war may also have an impact on Moscow’s relationship with Washington.

The U.S. joined the war against Iran on June 22, attacking three Iranian nuclear sites with bunker buster bombs and Tomahawk cruise missiles.

Trump's support for Israel's war effort may potentially strain U.S.-Russian relations.

"Trump’s support for Israel and its participation in the Israel-Iran war is highly personalized," Quilliam said. "It has the potential to spoil relations between the U.S. and Russia but so much depends on Trump's temperament and his willingness to accommodate Putin's concerns."

He argued that Putin "will feel betrayed by Trump and, therefore, less willing to negotiate in good faith."

"As such, Trump-Putin relations will likely cool, and this may force the U.S. to recalibrate its position towards Russia vis-a-vis Ukraine," Neil continued.

But other analysts argue that the impact of the Israeli-Iranian war on U.S.-Russian relations should not be overestimated.

"I don’t think this war makes much difference to Russian-American relations, to be honest," Lund said. "They had plenty to disagree on already. It could go the other way, too, if the war is followed by a diplomatic process. Russia will try to position itself as a facilitator of any new nuclear agreement between Iran and the United States."

He also said that the U.S. "needs Russian acquiescence or support in order to get a new Iran (nuclear) deal endorsed by the Security Council."

"So there is in fact some level of shared interest here, despite the very severe Russian-U.S. disagreements on most other things relating to Iran," Lund added.

Russian-Israeli relations have also been undermined by Israel's wars with Iran and its proxies.

Analysts say, however, that the Iranian-Israeli war will not lead to a complete break between Russia and Israel.

Quilliam argued that Russian-Israeli relations "will remain unchanged, as the two countries are accustomed to deconflicting interests in theatres of war, as they did in Syria."

Lund said that Russian-Israeli relations were "bad already" before the Iranian-Israeli war.

"In so far as we are now about to enter a diplomatic phase, Russia could try to act as a go-between for the Israelis, since it has relations with both parties," he added.

"Israel’s interest is ultimately to get Russia to distance itself from Iran, and that’s one reason the Israelis are reluctant to see their ties with Moscow deteriorate too much. They need to be able to continue that bargaining."

Chris York and Yuliia Taradiuk contributed to this report.

Note from the author:

Hello! My name is Oleg Sukhov, the guy who wrote this piece for you.

I was born in Russia and moved to Ukraine in 2014 because I couldn't stand the suffocating atmosphere of that semi-totalitarian country. I used to think it might be possible to transform Russia into a liberal Western-oriented country. Now it's clear that it's a lost cause.

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