Analysis: Did Ukraine's '40-day campaign' against Russia change anything?

In late June, President Volodymyr Zelensky tasked Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) with launching a "40-day influence operation" designed to compel Russia to "end the war."

In the weeks following, Ukraine's mid- and long-range drones scored some headline-grabbing successes — the crippling of dozens of Russian tankers supplying occupied Crimea and, perhaps most notably, the destruction of several warehouses across the country belonging to online retailer Wildberries.

But 40 days later, Russia's war in Ukraine still rages, and Russian President Vladimir Putin shows no signs that he intends to stop any time soon.

"I think the ultimate aim was not achievable given Putin's commitment to the war and Russian society's general apathy to and accommodation of the war," Dr. Jade McGlynn, head of the Ukraine and Russia Program at King's College London, told the Kyiv Independent.

But according to Ukrainian officials familiar with the planning, one of the operation's central political objectives was looking further ahead than the stated 40 days — to force Russians to experience the consequences of the war more directly with a view to influencing elections in September.

The stated results

Details of what the campaign actually constituted remained sparse until it ended, when the SBU released a statement on Aug. 4 clarifying the actions that the agency claimed were part of it.

According to the statement, the campaign "was aimed at simultaneously weakening key elements of the Russian military machine."

One of the significant military developments in the timescale of the "40-day operation" was a series of strikes against Russian oil and cargo vessels by Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces in the Sea of Azov, a part of Ukraine's months-long campaign to isolate the Crimean peninsula with drone and missile strikes.

Other long-standing Ukrainian military campaigns continued during the period. Ukraine's systematic demolition of Russia's oil industry continued, leading to shortages of diesel, gasoline, and other refined petroleum products across Russia, and long queues at gas stations.

"These successful strikes significantly hampered the resupply of Russian units on the front line and disrupted logistics and the supply of ammunition and fuel," Nazarii Barchuk, an analyst at the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center, told the Kyiv Independent.

The unstated achievements

The SBU statement claimed that the campaign included "systematic destruction of military aviation and air defense," "kinetic sanctions on the Russian fuel and energy sector," "defeat of the 'shadow fleet'," as well as strikes against targets on the battlefield.

It made no mention of Wildberries.

Although Kyiv publicly argues that Wildberries was targeted because it facilitated the sale of dual-use goods, officials speaking privately acknowledged another objective.

While declining to confirm whether strikes on Wildberries facilities officially formed part of the campaign, one Ukrainian official said the attacks fit that broader strategy by disrupting Russia's strained wartime economy while affecting the daily lives of ordinary citizens.

Ukraine began striking warehouses of the Russian logistics giant "Wildberries" overnight on July 18. Frequently compared to the U.S. retail giant Amazon, Wildberries holds about 45-50% of the Russian e-commerce market, with a turnover of around $75 billion annually.

Wildberries also supplies significant amounts of explicitly military materiel, such as body armor, fiber-optic spools for military drones, and equipment that allows civilian drones to be converted to drop grenades, making the chain a potentially legitimate military target under international law.

As well as the direct financial impact on Wildberries itself, and the associated damage to the Russian economy of the loss of its e-commerce giant, the chain holds stock for tens of thousands of Russian small businesses.

As of Aug. 4, Ukraine claimed to have hit 15 Wildberries warehouses, damaging or destroying 13 of them. Reports of further strikes have emerged since then.

Russia also has more than 94,000 Wildberries pickup points, most of them operated by franchisees.

In many smaller towns, those locations have become essential distribution hubs where residents collect everything from school supplies to household goods.

"When Russians prepare their children for school, they often order uniforms, notebooks, pencils, and other essentials through Wildberries," one Ukrainian official said.

Internal Ukrainian documents reviewed by the Kyiv Independent indicate that 57% of Russians now report feeling anxious because of Ukrainian drone attacks.

According to one Ukrainian official, exposure to strikes further increases those levels of anxiety.

The Kyiv Independent could not independently verify the data, and officials declined to explain how it had been collected.

McGlynn told the Kyiv Independent she believed the operation had "clearly exacerbated existing strains and brought the war home to lots more people who wish to ignore it and its consequences."

The election

Another factor shaping Kyiv's thinking is Russia's parliamentary election, scheduled for Sept. 18-20.

Ukrainian officials say they do not expect genuinely independent opposition parties to enter parliament.

Instead, they see the vote as an opportunity to weaken confidence in the Kremlin by showing the gap between public sentiment and official election results.

"If Russians go to the polls and vote against Putin's United Russia, then see the official results showing the party winning 60%, they'll understand the numbers were fabricated," one Ukrainian official said. "That changes how people perceive the legitimacy of the system."

Officials in Kyiv remain skeptical that any political party can gain parliamentary representation without Kremlin approval.

They pointed to nominal opposition groups, including Yabloko, which campaigns on a platform calling for peace, but argued that no meaningful parliamentary opposition can emerge without Moscow's consent.

One Ukrainian official said, citing internal documents, that Kyiv believes the rating of United Russia stands at around 30-33%, the lowest ever.

The discontent inside Russia

Officials also said that some top Ukrainian envoys remain in contact with several Russian business figures.

According to the officials, those conversations have become noticeably more pessimistic in recent months, particularly after Ukraine expanded strikes against economic targets such as Wildberries.

Several Russian businessmen have privately voiced frustration over the economic costs of the war, one Ukrainian official said.

Even as Kyiv continues to publicly promote proposals for an air ceasefire and a broader halt to hostilities, Ukrainian officials insist the decision ultimately depends on Putin.

The officials said Russian businessmen and oligarchs have repeatedly suggested that Putin might eventually be willing to compromise, only for the Kremlin to reject any such possibility.

In Kyiv's assessment, this shows that, despite frustration among parts of Russia's business elite, authority over decisions about the war remains concentrated in Putin's hands.

"This creates a dangerous precedent for him," the official said.