Fourth year into Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine, the decisive support Kyiv found among its neighbors to the west is beginning to show cracks.
Once resolute Poland is seeing rising skepticism toward Ukraine, underscored by President-elect Karol Nawrocki's election victory. Slovakia's pro-Ukrainian government was ousted by Russian-friendly populists in the 2023 parliament elections, and Czechia may face a similar fate this year.
Pro-Western political forces have barely survived a pro-Russian takeover in Romania and Moldova, but the anti-Ukrainian parties remain powerful in both countries.
In contrast, the only actively pro-Russian government that has been in place since the start of the full-scale war, might soon lose an election of its own. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who has exasperated Ukraine and Brussels with his obstinately pro-Kremlin stances, faces a realistic possibility of defeat next year.
Ukraine still has allies in the neighborhood. But when compared to 2022, the trend is clear — A steady erosion of solidarity among Ukraine's partners in Central and Eastern Europe amid war fatigue, domestic concerns, and rising populism.
Poland — from champion to cautious ally
Unlike in many other countries, in Poland, a division between pro-Ukrainian and Ukraine-skeptic political forces cannot be neatly defined by party lines.
Case in point, President-elect Nawrocki is less sympathetic to Ukraine than his predecessor, Andrzej Duda, even though they both come from the same conservative camp centered around the Law and Justice (PiS) party.
The incoming Polish president is also taking a harder line on Ukraine than the centrist government led by Prime Minister Donald Tusk's Civic Coalition. While the Tusk government has openly backed Kyiv's NATO and EU aspirations, Nawrocki spoke out against both.
The historian-turned-president-elect has often employed historical grievances — namely, the World War II-era Volyn massacres — in his criticism, while denouncing Ukraine as "ungrateful" for Polish aid.
However, the vast majority of the Polish political spectrum, including the PiS, the current government, and Nawrocki, agrees that it is in Warsaw's interest to continue supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression.
After all, it was the previous PiS government that helped millions of Ukrainian refugees fleeing the country at the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, that sent tanks and MiG-29 fighter jets, and that turned eastern Poland into a key military aid hub for Ukraine.
The ties became strained later amid trade disputes, border blockades, and clashes over historical grievances, and did not disappear with the defeat of the PiS and Tusk's victory in the 2023 elections.
Yet, Poland stands out — its fluctuating relationship with Ukraine doesn't change the fact that in the country's war with Russia, it is strongly on Kyiv's side.
Ukraine is unlikely to lose Poland as its supporter, though Warsaw may not be the leading advocate for Ukrainian European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations it once was.
Can Hungary shift course?
As the region is sliding deeper into nationalist populism, Hungary may yet move in the opposite direction.
Peter Magyar, a renegade from Prime Minister Viktor Orban's Fidesz party, is taking Hungarian politics by storm. His Tisza party now leads polls, suggesting that Magyar has a good chance at dethroning Orban during the upcoming April 2026 parliamentary elections.
Orban has been in power in Hungary since 2010, with his tenure marked by clashes with the EU over human rights and the rule of law, warming relations with Russian and Chinese autocrats, and obstruction of military and political support for Kyiv.
Whether Magyar's victory next year could bring change remains to be seen. The rising opposition leader visited Kyiv after a Russian attack on the Okhmatdyt hospital last July, but otherwise avoided making any clear commitments to Ukraine. And he has reasons to.
"In order to win the elections, (Tisza) needs to win over voters from Fidesz, and, after 15 years of indoctrination, this will not be possible if Tisza takes a broadly pro-Ukrainian stance," Csilla Fedinec, senior research fellow at HUN-REN Center for Social Sciences in Budapest, told the Kyiv Independent.
"In Hungary, the elections are free but definitely not fair."
Dorka Takacsy, a research fellow at the Center for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Democracy (CEID) and visiting fellow at the German Marshall Fund, nevertheless says that Magyar might decide to support Ukraine to position himself as Orban's "polar opposite."
Magyar's victory is far from certain, however.
"There are insane disparities with regards not only in access to the media, but also finance-wise" between the "state party" Fidesz and the Tisza newcomers, Takacsy said, adding that "in Hungary, the elections are free but definitely not fair."
Romania remains on Ukraine's side, but pro-Russian challenge grows
Looking from Ukraine's perspective, Romania has avoided becoming "another Hungary" by the skin of its teeth, as numerous polls projected that anti-Ukraine and hard-right George Simion could win the presidential office this May.
Simion had strong chances, taking over the "sovereignist" banner from pro-Russian ultranationalist Calin Georgescu, who came in first in the annulled election last November but was barred from running again.
A far-right victory would have been a major upheaval for the key NATO member that was pivotal in helping Ukraine ship out its grain amid Black Sea blockades and provided a full Patriot air defense system.
Bucharest "will have a stable pro-EU, pro-NATO, and pro-Ukrainian force until the next parliamentary elections."
Bucharest Mayor Nicusor Dan, a pro-EU centrist, defied expectations when he defeated Simion by a solid margin. This ensured "that Romania will stay on the pro-Western track," Sergiu Miscoiu, a political science professor at the Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, told the Kyiv Independent.
Romania's political woes are far from over, as Dan must now help broker a new government among pro-EU parties. Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu's pro-Ukrainian cabinet resigned after its candidate failed to advance past the first round of the presidential election.
If these negotiations are successful, "which is highly probable," Bucharest "will have a stable pro-EU, pro-NATO, and pro-Ukrainian force until the next parliamentary elections," Miscoiu added.
The specter of the massive right-wing, anti-establishment surge among Romanians persists, however.
Simion's party, the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), went from 9% support in 2020 to 18% during last year's parliamentary vote, becoming the leading opposition force and the second-biggest party in the parliament. Its support only continues to surge, now hitting 38% in some surveys.
Such broad backing for a party whose leader has been banned entry to Ukraine due to what the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) called "systematic anti-Ukrainian activities" and who openly opposed military aid for Ukraine should be a worrying signal for Kyiv.
Moldova's pro-EU path faces second challenge
Just like in Romania, Moldova's pro-EU and pro-Ukrainian leadership has evaded defeat by Moscow-friendly opposition — but their fight is not over.
Moldova's small population, modest military, and limited economic capacity restrict its ability to play a major military role in the pro-Kyiv coalition. In spite of this, Chisinau has stood by Ukraine since the onset of Russia's full-scale invasion and has become its partner on the path toward EU accession.
Pro-European President Maia Sandu won reelection in November 2024 by defeating Alexandr Stoianoglo, a former prosecutor endorsed by pro-Russian ex-President Igor Dodon.
However, the simultaneous non-binding referendum on Moldova's EU aspirations showed only a razor-thin margin in support of the accession. Sandu cried foul, accusing Russia of an "unprecedented" interference in its favor.
Now, pro-Russian forces within the country are gearing up for another attempt to grab power, this time during the September parliamentary elections — a vote with potentially major ramifications in the semi-parliamentary republic.
Sandu's party, the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), currently holds the majority, but faces a challenge from a coalition of three parties led by Stoianoglo.
"If Sandu's party loses majority in the parliament, Maia Sandu will be forced to cohabit with a parliament that is more powerful in terms" of approving the prime minister and the government, Miscoiu said.
In such a situation, Chisinau would not turn openly pro-Russian, the expert says. However, it would shift toward a "neutral" status that would allow the activation of various pro-Russian elements, some of which are currently banned in Moldova, and compromise the country's EU hopes, he added.
Slovakia's U-turn under Fico, and what comes next
Few European countries have seen such a radical foreign policy shift in recent years as Slovakia after the electoral victory of the populist, left-nationalist Robert Fico in the fall of 2023.
The nation that was one of the first to provide Ukraine with fighter jets — not to mention an S-300 air defense system, artillery, and more — now ranks alongside Orban's Hungary as the most Moscow-friendly government in the EU and NATO.
Fico's role as a disruptor has largely been about theatrics, from his meeting with Putin in Moscow last year to his appearance on Russian propagandist Olga Skabeyeva's channel and his presence at the Moscow Victory Day parades on May 9 — an event even Orban avoided.
The Slovak leader has also clashed with Ukraine over the transit of Russian gas, halted military aid from (largely emptied out) Slovak military arsenals, and threatened to block the upcoming package of EU sanctions.
However, mass protests against Bratislava's pro-Moscow orientation and the dropping public support for coalition parties show that Fico's hold on power is far from secure.
Fico's foreign policy turn has also sparked criticism within the coalition. Slovak President Peter Pellegrini, Fico's ally and founder of the co-ruling Hlas party, has rebuked the government for moving away from its Western partners and announced his visit to Kyiv.
Should Fico's grip on power continue to weaken, Slovakia's geopolitical course could change yet again.
Czechia slipping away from Ukraine
While not directly sharing borders with Ukraine, Czechia — lying less than 300 kilometers from the warring country — has been a significant player in both military and humanitarian assistance for Kyiv.
Since 2022, Czechia has provided shelter to some 400,000 Ukrainian refugees. Prague was also behind the international ammunition initiative, which provided Ukraine with 1.5 million high-caliber rounds in 2024 and an additional 400,000 as of the spring of 2025.
But the parties that oversaw these policies seem to have a slim chance of retaining the parliamentary majority in the upcoming October elections.
The populist ANO movement of billionaire and ex-Prime Minister Andrej Babis is leading Spolu — the center-right coalition that is the main force in the government — by some 10 percentage points, meaning Babis is very likely to return to power by the end of this year.
In the runup to the vote, Babis has increasingly lambasted the government's support for Ukrainian refugees, arguing that it comes at the expense of Czech families. Babis's right-hand man, Karel Havlicek, even declared earlier this year that ANO would kill the ammunition initiative for Ukraine, though the party later muted this statement.
While ANO has largely tried to avoid the topic of Ukraine as a major topic, this now seems to change as Babis is fishing "in the anti-systemic waters," likely to counter the rise of the more radical and anti-Ukrainian SPD party, Pavel Havlicek (no relation), a research fellow at the Association for International Affairs in Prague, told the Kyiv Independent.
Paradoxically, the far-right SPD and the communist-led Stacilo! (Enough!) bloc appear to be ANO's most likely coalition partners. These radical groups "come with a very clear agenda undermining the course of Czech foreign policy," Havlicek said.
"At the same time, ANO has a weaker and less articulated position on most matters, which might further empower the smaller political actor(s) to take matters into their own hands, including taking over the Czech Foreign Ministry," he adds.
No matter the result of the parliamentary elections, Ukraine will continue to have a vocal advocate in President Petr Pavel – though presidential powers in Czechia are limited.
By mid-2025, support for Ukraine is showing signs of strain in Central and Eastern Europe. Yet, pro-Ukrainian forces have managed to score some surprising wins, showing that victory against the rising wave of pro-Russian populism is possible.
