Putin under pressure to declare war on Ukraine, but experts say Russia isn't ready
Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Novo-Ogaryovo state residence outside Moscow, Russia, on June 4, 2025. (Gavriil Grigorov / POOL / AFP via Getty Images)
Russia
Despite suffering over 1 million casualties, pounding Ukrainian cities nightly with missiles and drones, and committing countless war crimes, one startling fact about Russia's full-scale invasion remains — Moscow has yet to officially declare war on Ukraine.
In February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin described what he believed was going to be a swift victory and the capture of Kyiv within days as a "special military operation."
Nearly three-and-a-half years later, the Kremlin is stuck with the term, caught in a quandary of its own making — waging by what any measure is a war, while being unable to call it one for fear of a domestic backlash.
"Putin has protected himself in this war by separating the direct effects of the war from the majority of the Russian population."
A formal declaration of war would have far-reaching implications for the country's industry and economy, as well as allowing the Kremlin to launch a full mobilization.
But partial mobilization announced in September 2022 led to the only widespread protests against the war inside Russia, making clear to Putin that announcing anything more would cause him serious political problems.
"Putin has protected himself in this war by separating the direct effects of the war from the majority of the Russian population," Karolina Hird, Russia deputy team lead at the Institute for the Study of War, told the Kyiv Independent.
"But as soon as that starts to spill over and actually be felt by more of the Russian domestic population, that's when he gets into more trouble."
According to reports, there has recently been unrest within the Kremlin after Ukraine's audacious Operation Spiderweb, with hardliners reportedly pressuring Putin to make a formal war declaration that would permit true retaliation and escalation, and give the Russian government sweeping authority to shift the country fully onto a wartime footing.
But experts who spoke to the Kyiv Independent say this is unlikely, arguing that for all intents and purposes, Russia's industry and economy are already on a wartime footing even if Kremlin officials deny this, and that Putin simply can't risk his hold on power by launching what would be a deeply unpopular mobilization.
What would a Russian declaration of war mean?
The two major factors that would come into play are the Russian economy and the Russian people.
A full war footing would be a complete pivot of the economy and its workers towards defense and the production of weapons, and allow for a full mobilization to conscript the necessary manpower to use them.
The Kremlin is projected to allocate 6.3% of its GDP to defense this year — the highest level since the Cold War — yet still far below what would typically indicate a country fully mobilized for war.
By contrast, Ukraine spent 34% of its GDP on defense last year, while British military spending surpassed 50% of GDP during the Second World War.
These same figures were cited by Russian Ambassador to the U.K. Andrey Kelin in an interview with CNN last week as evidence that Russia was in fact still fighting a "special military operation," and not a war.
Experts are not convinced.
"The Russian economy is already on a war footing, and the 6.5% of GDP spent on defense for 2025 is likely an underestimation," Federico Borsari, a defense expert at the D.C.-based Center for European Policy Analysis, told the Kyiv Independent.
"Defense production in key capability segments such as drones, missiles, and armored vehicles is at full steam, with up to three worker shifts per day."
Russia has drastically upped weapons production in recent months as it drains its stockpiles.
According to data from Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR) shared with the Kyiv Independent earlier this month, production of ballistic missiles, for example, has increased by at least 66% over the past year.
Hird agrees with Borsari's analysis, saying the massive boost in defense manufacturing is a sign that, despite Russia's claims that it isn't at war, its depleted stockpiles are a pretty clear sign they are.
"It's not like Russia has a secret reserve of weapons in the background that it can somehow kind of unlock and unleash on Ukraine," she said.
"Russia is already fighting an all-out war in Ukraine, so there's actually not much more that can be done on their side."
The manpower issue
The one crucial area in which a declaration of all-out war against Ukraine could significantly boost Russia's ability to wage war is manpower.
Throughout the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Putin has steered clear of a full mobilization, conscious of the domestic backlash it would create.
Instead, the Kremlin has simply paid people to fight, offering huge sign-up bonuses to encourage people to volunteer, a method which, up to now has managed to replenish the huge losses the army has incurred, but which many experts think is unsustainable.
"In terms of manpower, Russia still has a sizeable population pool it can draw from, at least in the near term, especially in peripheral regions," Borsari said.
"However, this pool may not be sufficient to sustain the current pace of losses, with thousands of casualties each week, beyond the first half of 2026."
With no end to the war in sight, that looming deadline will likely pose a huge dilemma for Putin — how to find enough men to fight, without losing his hold on power?
"They are aware of the massive risks involved and Putin is rather risk-aversive," Ryhor Nizhnikau, a Russia expert at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, told the Kyiv Independent.
"Full mobilization is expected to have a destabilizing effect on Putin’s regime, the already ailing Russian economy, and it will certainly unbalance the current public consensus on the war."
The geopolitical aspect
Declaring war on Ukraine would also have international ramifications for Putin, Shea said.
"He will no longer be able to pretend to (U.S. President Donald Trump and (U.S. Special Envoy Steve) Witkoff that he is interested primarily in a partial victory by taking only the Donetsk region and Crimea," he said.
"He also said in St Petersburg last week that Russia posed no threat to NATO and that NATO was rearming for nothing. But a formal Russian declaration of war will convey the entirely opposite message."
