Mongolia laid out the red carpet — literally — for Russian President Vladimir Putin when he arrived in the country on Sept. 2. But as the country is a signatory to the International Criminal Court (ICC)’s Rome Statute, the visit should have meant Putin’s arrest.
Putin was issued an arrest warrant by the ICC in March 2023 for the forcible transfer of children from Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. Adherents of the statute are required to arrest individuals wanted by the court upon arrival in their country.
Ahead of the visit, both Ukraine and the West urged Mongolia to fulfill its obligations and arrest the Russian leader, but citing economic ties with its neighbor, refused to do so.
For Putin, the trip was likely more strategic than a chance to snub the ICC. While not officially listed as part of the official visit, Putin is widely believed to have used it as a chance to discuss the construction of pipelines to carry gas from Russia to China through Mongolia.
After the visit, the two countries announced they had signed several agreements to cooperate on energy projects, the supply of Russian aviation fuel, rail connections, and an environmental study on how a proposed Mongolian hydroelectric plant could pollute Russia’s Lake Baikal.
Ukrainian lawmakers, for their part, in an open letter called for Putin’s arrest, telling the Kyiv Independent before the trip the visit was “a well-planned provocation” aimed at showing the “weakness of the ICC and international law.”
Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed during the visit it had nothing to do with sending “any signals to the West” but was instead focused on further developing bilateral relations.
At the same time, Peskov also said the following day that “the whole story with the ICC…cannot and will not be a limitation in the development of Russia's relations with partner states that are interested in developing bilateral relations and covering international contacts.”
The notion that it was a trip based on economic partnership was dismissed by some Western analysts.
“The overriding reason for this trip will have been to show that Putin can travel right now,” said Sam Greene, the director of democratic resilience at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).
Mongolia in a bind
A country of only 3.4 million in a massive landmass of more than 600,000 square miles wedged between two much larger powers — Russia and China — Mongolia has tread lightly in the thirty years since the fall of the Soviet Union.
While the country is one of the few democracies in the region and has sought to increase its ties to the West, its larger neighbors limit how far that can go — and how much Mongolia can truly spurn Russia.
In a defense of its inaction, a Mongolian government spokesperson told Politico on Sep. 3 that its hands were essentially tied in not arresting Putin.
“Mongolia imports 95% of its petroleum products and over 20% of electricity from our immediate neighborhood (Russia), which has previously suffered interruption for technical reasons. This supply is critical to ensure our existence and that of our people," the spokesperson said.
Mongolia has not actively supported Russia’s full-scale war but also abstained from a U.N. vote to condemn it.
On Mongolian social media, some users criticized the statement from Heorhii Tykhyi, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry, who said that the country should face “consequences” for refusing to arrest Putin.
Many wrote that despite personal feelings of support for Ukraine, the government had no choice.
Arresting Putin would have been “committing suicide” for Mongolia, one user wrote.
Other commentators acknowledged that the visit — initiated by an invitation from President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh — was a diplomatic faux pas that at the very least could have been avoided.
Mongolia’s gas bridge to China
The trip was most likely “about pursuing national interests, which in this case was in the sphere of energy,” according to Pavel Havlicek, a research fellow at the Association for International Affairs.
“The fact that he wasn’t captured and transferred to The Hague comes only as an added benefit,” said Havlicek. As Europe has sought to wean itself from Russian energy, Moscow has found new customers, primarily India and China.
"The fact that he wasn’t captured and transferred to The Hague comes only as an added benefit."
Russia has significantly boosted its export of oil and gas to India since the beginning of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as well as a more modest increase to China, but its pipeline infrastructure pales in comparison to what Russia previously constructed to connect it to Europe.
The 3,968-kilometer (2,466 mi) Power of Siberia pipeline, which came online in 2019, connects natural gas fields in eastern Siberia with China. It is expected to reach its full capacity of 38 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2025.
Russia and the state-owned energy giant Gazprom have also planned another project, the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, to further increase the flow of gas to China.
The proposed 3,550-kilometer (2,205 miles) pipeline, which has been planned since 2013, would bring gas from Russia’s Yamal peninsula in the Arctic through existing pipelines, down through western Siberia, across Mongolia, and into China.
The Yamal fields are the source of gas that used to primarily flow to Europe.
The construction, which includes 950 kilometers of new pipeline through Mongolian territory, was originally set to begin in 2024. Gazprom said in a 2020 feasibility study that the pipeline should be operational by 2030.
But Mongolian Prime Minister Luvsannamsrain Oyun-Erdene said in January 2024 that China and Russia have yet to agree on some key parts of the project.
"The Chinese and Russian sides are still doing the calculations and estimations and they are working on the economic benefits," Oyun-Erdene said.
Some analysts have speculated that the delays are likely because China knows that it has the upper hand over Russia, which has shrunk its pool of export partners due to its military aggression against Ukraine.
As a result, China may be trying to negotiate a better deal.
Speaking to reporters on Sept. 3, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that talks on the pipeline are ongoing and that their conclusion is not tied “to a certain date, a certain visit.”
In an interview with the Mongolian newspaper Onodar ahead of the trip, Putin said that Mongolia could potentially use some of the gas in transit through its territory.
Even if the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline wasn’t on the official agenda, that does not mean the pipeline was not discussed.
“There are things that are officially mentioned, and there are things you don’t want to speak about,” said Havlicek.
Daniil Ukhorskiy
