Editor's note: This article is a special edition of the KI Insights' The Week Ahead newsletter, looking at challenges and opportunities facing Ukraine in 2025.
2025 is gearing up to be a decisive year for Ukraine. The country’s leadership will need to navigate a turbulent international landscape, as well as political and military realities that will constrain its options.
Here are 5 major trends to watch in the year to come that will shape expectations for the potential end of the Russia-Ukraine war, or move it to its next stage.
The “Trump 2” Presidency: Instability and Isolationism?
President-elect Donald Trump has made ending the Russia-Ukraine war a priority – but on what terms? His inbound administration counts many Ukraine sceptics and even Russia sympathizers; he is antagonistic towards allies.
Encouragingly, both Trump and his Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia Keith Kellogg seem interested in maintaining or even increasing military support for Ukraine (if only to boost U.S. defense production ahead of potential conflict with China).
But the main source of tension is that, ultimately, the U.S. has far fewer ways to pressure Russia than it does Ukraine. Hence, making a deal happen is more likely to happen at the expense of additional Ukrainian concessions, not Russian ones.
Providing security guarantees – the key Ukrainian demand – goes against the general theme of disengagement and isolationism that runs across much of the Trump support base. Although the U.S. is the only power that can provide the kind of guarantees Ukraine needs, a generally hostile approach to allies will make building a coalition of decisive actors more difficult.
Kellogg is currently developing a “Trump Victory Plan,” replacing Zelensky’s version (which has failed to find favor with the new U.S. administration). Both Ukraine and its allies will continue to lobby both Kellogg and Trump, including during the former’s upcoming Europe trip.
Importantly, Russia will likely also try to humor Trump, pretending to engage in diplomacy (possibly also lobbying for a global “grand bargain”). This would likely be aimed at buying time, tying up aid, and extracting demoralizing concessions.
In the end, however, Russia will likely refuse to go forward with any deal that is not devastating to Ukraine and reduces Moscow’s ability to re-escalate on its terms. What will Trump do then? Will he find a way to pressure Russia or, more likely, will he get bored, disengage, and blame former President Joe Biden and Zelensky for leaving “a mess”.
Zelensky’s growing domestic challenges
A potential ceasefire would likely mean an end to martial law and hence elections. But even without a reduction in fighting both Russian propaganda and the incoming U.S. administration are talking about the legitimacy of Ukraine’s leadership. This raises the likelihood that 2025 will see both parliamentary and presidential contests.
Neither will be easy for Zelensky. Continued economic hardship, mobilization have weighed on the President’s support. Opposition forces are mobilizing, mainly with one strategy – attacking the incumbent’s record. In the short term, this will make it harder for the Zelensky administration to make needed but unpopular decisions.
The big question is whether ex-Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Valerii Zaluzhnyi will run. He has shown no inclination, but this may be a poor indicator – if he were to run his best strategy is stay quiet and avoid public comments that could betray his lack of political experience.
But this is not the only consideration. Zelensky’s control of administrative resources and considerable influence over media (including the united TV broadcast and anonymous social media channels) make it tempting to manipulate the playing field (which could harm relations with allies).
Additionally, Russia may require that Zelensky doesn’t run as the basis of a peace deal (which would probably be counter-productive). Conversely, would he receive an endorsement from Trump? This raises the question of security guarantees for the President and his allies – a factor that will impact their decisions and strategy regarding any elections.
Finally, given Ukraine’s history of revolutions, a third Maidan is a remote possibility – most likely led by the military/ nationalist bloc. Neutralizing any such protests risks sparking a backlash and further unrest.
Will Ukraine reach a military breaking point?
The situation on the battlefield has grown more critical for Ukraine in 2024. The failure of mobilization to address key personnel shortages has left the country struggling to defend itself effectively. Furthermore, a change in the White House has meant that military aid is no longer a certainty, and Europe would struggle to fill this void.
The most critical shortage concerns manpower, something that can be partially remedied by Kyiv, albeit at a significant political cost. The current system created a “first instance” loophole for desertions; lowering the mobilization age could further plug the gap (although it would require additional reform of the system, as the change from 27 to 25 failed to deliver needed results).
While critical to avoiding a Ukrainian loss, Western aid has also been unhelpfully organized: new capabilities were often introduced late, at small scale, publicly and out of sync with battlefield needs. The result has more often served to vaccinate the Russian army against Western solutions than it has turned the tide of the war.
As a result, changing the dynamics now requires a proportionally greater level of support than previously – and likely more than Ukraine’s allies are ready for. An alternative option is deploying European boots on the ground, something that is currently politically unpalatable but that may change in 2025.
Despite these challenges, Ukraine’s ability to withstand Russian aggression – even relying solely on its own resources – is likely underestimated. Moreover, Kyiv retains the ability to escalate, or threaten to escalate, in asymmetric ways (e.g., attacks against civilian infrastructure in Russia, invading Transnistria, support for Islamic movements in Africa and the Middle East) that will make Western policy-makers uncomfortable and hence unlikely to drop support.
The key question is how long Ukraine can delay giving in. The looming Battle of Pokrovsk will likely serve as a litmus test – should the loss be fast, say 2 to 3 months, Russia will likely see Ukraine’s capabilities as fundamentally degraded and push for tough conditions. Conversely, holding out till summer (in line with incremental gains secured by Russia in 2023-2024), would likely underscore Ukraine’s ability to resist until more favorable terms are met.
The fragility of democracy: Hybrid war beyond Ukraine
Europe surprised many in 2022 when it quickly condemned Russia and strongly supported Ukraine. But sustaining support in 2025 will be more challenging as higher costs of living, “accommodating” Ukrainian refugees and Russian influence operations will continue to eat away at public support.
Ukraine has already witnessed electoral reversals among allies, notably in Slovakia, France, and the U.S. (and, for a moment, in Romania). However, so far, the actual impact on policy has been fairly muted.
That may change in 2025, for two reasons. Firstly, the number of relevant elections is much higher – Germany, Czechia, Romania, and Poland, among others, will all face key votes. Although more people went to the polls in 2024, this year may more directly impact Ukraine.
Secondly, an even more unpredictable social media space increases the likelihood of chaotic outcomes. The case of Romania, where actual Russian interference may have been overstated (vs. actual domestic factors), could be repeated elsewhere – and manipulated by Russia. This is hardly an environment in which Ukraine wants to build a coalition of support.
Electoral challenges and hybrid operations may not be aimed so much at directly changing outcomes, but also at tying up the energies of key allies. Germany will face federal elections at a time when a clear European voice in negotiations is needed. France, arguably the key security state for Europe, seems engulfed in endless domestic challenges.
Doubtless, Russian meddling will also try to slow down Ukraine’s European Union accession and frustrate Kyiv (who, in turn, may use this as an excuse to skip the line on various “bureaucratic issues” that are core to the EU).
Importantly, Russia’s hybrid war against the West may eventually backfire. Although it has been highlighted by analysts for years, a mainstream response has been lacking. Could this change in 2025?
Is this the year that Russia (finally) collapses?
The idea of Russia eventually collapsing, or at least running out of munitions, has been around since 2022. More often than not, these analyses point to 2025-2026 as the moment that shortages (of tanks, manpower, shells/ barrels… ) start to compound.
One of the chief proponents of such a theory is Ukraine’s head of Military Intelligence Kyrylo Budanov. He has previously stated expectations that Russia’s economy would start to falter and that weapons stocks would begin to run dry over the coming year and a half.
While Russia retains options to address its challenges – securing men and arms from allies, increasing payments to new recruits… – these come at increasingly high trade-offs. In particular, record-high interest rates and labor shortages are constraining the Russian economy. The result of shortages is arguably already visible in Syria, where Russia was unable to prop up its ally.
Despite surprising resilience, Russia is also suffering from Western sanctions and pressure on third countries that have acted as supply routes has had some impact. The pressure on Russia is undeniably real, but assessing how quickly this will take effect is highly speculative.
The big question is who will blink first – a Russian regime all-in on destroying Ukraine or Western allies held hostage by opinion polls?
Felix Blatt
