Ten years after Kyiv and Moscow first negotiated a ceasefire to end the fighting in Ukraine’s east, the two sides may once again find themselves around the negotiating table to reach a truce on the battlefield.
This time around, Kyiv insists that any ceasefire alone will not be enough to guarantee Ukraine’s security if Russia’s full-scale invasion is brought to an end through peace negotiations.
After Russia invaded Ukraine’s eastern Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts with the use of proxy forces in the spring of 2014, multiple truces were negotiated between 2014 and 2015 as part of what became known as the Minsk Process, named for the city in the neighboring Belarus where the talks took place.
France, Germany, and OSCE acted as mediators in negotiations between the Ukrainian government and the self-proclaimed independent "republics," set up and financed by Russia in Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. Russia, a signatory to the agreements, positioned itself as a neutral broker, while in fact being a party and the instigator of the conflict.
But following both rounds of negotiations, referred to as Minsk-1 and 2, Russian-backed militants in the area violated the various ceasefires dozens of times.
Still, Russia has continuously blamed Ukraine for failing to perform the Minsk agreements. In 2022, Russia pronounced that the agreements “no longer existed” and used it as one of the pretexts to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Over the years, observers have argued that Ukraine, under pressure from its international partners and a deteriorating situation on the battlefield, was forced to sign an unfavorable deal in 2014 and an even worse one in 2015.
Needing financial support from the West and time to build up its military, Ukraine felt it had no choice but to sign the agreements. The thinking at the time was, according to then-Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin, “If we don’t sign (the agreements), then what are we going to do?”
With fresh memories of this failed peace process, President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly stated Ukraine would not accept a negotiated end to the invasion that does not contain firm security guarantees from partners.
Anastasiia Lapatina
Minsk-1: First attempt to sign a deal
The invasion of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by Russian forces began in April 2014, when several dozen armed people led by Igor Girkin, also known by his alias "Igor Strelkov," a retired Federal Security Service's (FSB) colonel, seized administrative buildings in the city of Sloviansk.
Ukraine lost control of the Russian-Ukrainian border in Luhansk Oblast, through which Moscow supplied weapons and equipment.
Russia, which annexed Crimea earlier the same year, claimed that the armed conflict in Donbas was an internal political affair of Ukraine caused by the discontent of residents. International and Ukrainian monitoring bodies, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), found evidence suggesting otherwise.
Russian-backed militants received significant reinforcements in August 2014, when the regular Russian army joined them in the area of Ilovaisk and helped to surround Ukrainian troops. Their encirclement ended in what is now known as the “Ilovaisk Tragedy” when Russian forces fired upon evacuating Ukrainian troops, despite the Russian side agreeing to a “green corridor” to ensure their safe passage. Three hundred sixty Ukrainian soldiers were killed in the onslaught.
Amid heavy territorial and personnel losses, less than two weeks later, on Sept. 5, 2014, Kyiv was forced to sit down at the negotiating table within the Trilateral Contact Group, consisting of Ukraine, Russia, and OSCE officials. Those talks led to the conclusion of the Minsk Protocol, also known as Minsk-1, a 12-point document aimed at establishing a ceasefire in Donbas.
The protocol included an immediate bilateral cessation of the use of weapons, ensuring OSCE monitoring, the release of all hostages, the withdrawal of armed groups from Ukraine, and the adoption of a law on the special status of the occupied territories of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts and the holding of early local elections there.
The document was signed by the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Heidi Tagliavini, Ukraine's second President Leonid Kuchma, and then-Ambassador of Russia to Ukraine Mikhail Zurabov. Russian proxies Alexander Zakharchenko and Igor Plotnitsky, who represented the militants in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, also signed the protocol.
During an additional round of talks on Sept. 19, the parties also agreed on a nine-point memorandum that specified the truce terms, including a ban on military aircraft flights over the agreed security zone, the withdrawal of heavy weapons, and the withdrawal of foreign mercenaries, among other obligations.
"Maybe 1% of me believed that the Minsk Agreements would work. At the same time, 99% were sure that they would not."
While the agreement led to reduced fighting, it failed to bring an end to hostilities, forcing the parties back to the negotiating table.
"Maybe 1% of me believed that the Minsk Agreements would work. At the same time, 99% were sure that they would not," then-reconnaissance platoon commander Ruslan with the callsign "Spasatel" ("the savior" in English), who served near Shyrokyne in Donetsk Oblast at that time, told the Kyiv Independent. He is identified only by his first name and callsign for security reasons.
Kateryna Hodunova
Minsk-2 agreement: Ukraine forced to sign a worse deal
In early 2015, Russian-backed troops from Donetsk Oblast captured the Donetsk Airport after months of extremely heavy fighting. Following its takeover, Russian-backed militants along with regular Russian troops launched an assault on the strategically important city of Debaltseve, sitting between Donetsk and Luhansk
Ukraine, once again finding itself in a weaker position on the battlefield and under pressure from its European partners, agreed to a second round of talks in Minsk. Ukraine and Russia met for the second time on Feb. 11-12, 2015.
This time, the talks included a long meeting of the Normandy Format, represented by then-Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Francois Hollande, and Russian President Vladimir Putin. For the first time, the countries' leaders met in Minsk — previously, the negotiations in Belarus had been held at a lower level.
"For them, it was a way of making us fundamentally dependent (on Russia)."
The talks lasted nearly 16 hours. Following the negotiations, the leaders agreed on a 13-point Package of Measures for implementing the new agreements. The Trilateral Contact Group signed it, and the Minsk-2 agreement was officially born.
According to Minsk-2, a comprehensive ceasefire had to be declared at the front line starting at midnight on Feb. 15, 2015. Unlike the Minsk-1 agreements that created a buffer zone on the Russia-Ukraine border, under Minsk-2, the OSCE was supposed to monitor the disengagement of weapons at the contact line, but access was limited.
Minsk-2 also included a point on the self-governance of the Russian-occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Russia pushed for their recognition as autonomous regions to be enshrined in Ukraine’s constitution.
"For them, it was a way of making us fundamentally dependent (on Russia)," Klimkin, Ukraine’s foreign minister at the time, told the Kyiv Independent.
Minsk agreement immediately breaks
Within minutes of the declaration of a comprehensive ceasefire on Feb. 15, the OSCE recorded shelling of Ukrainian positions.
Three days later, over 2,500 Ukrainian soldiers were forced to withdraw from Debaltseve. According to Ukraine's Defense Ministry, 110 soldiers were killed, 270 wounded, seven were captured, and 18 went missing in Debaltseve from Jan. 15 until Feb. 18.
"The attacks did not stop. They just became less intense," then-reconnaissance platoon commander Ruslan, with the callsign "Spasatel," said.
In the end, Minsk Agreements failed to stop the war, leaving the conflict mostly frozen. The documents signed in Minsk also were never ratified by any parliament, giving them no real legal weight.
Even during the years between the Minsk Agreements and the full-scale invasion, the fighting never fully stopped. Hundreds of Ukrainian soldiers were killed during this period, including some 65 soldiers in 2021.
Recalling the agreements in 2022, Poroshenko said that the most important thing then was to buy time for Ukraine and slow down Russia's advance in the east.
Oleg Sukhov
"Our task was, first, to avert the threat or at least delay the war. To get eight years to restore economic growth and build the strength of the Armed Forces," Poroshenko said. "It was achieved."
The OSCE, which was supposed to record ceasefire violations and war crimes, was often refused access to Russian-occupied territory by the Kremlin-backed militants. Ruslan, the Ukrainian soldier with the call sign "Spasatel," recalled this peacekeeping mission as "absolutely useless" because it operated mainly on the territory controlled by Ukraine.
Paris and Berlin, meanwhile, were more preoccupied with avoiding any escalation with the Kremlin and deepening economic ties with Russia.
"Merkel launched the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline in 2015. Despite discussions with Ukraine and the EU, she kept repeating that it was just 'an economic project’," Klimkin said.
"The logic then was: 'Let's stop (this war where it is) and try to settle down.' And much of the West believed in this logic," Klimkin added.
Later negotiations that took place under the Normandy Format in 2019, which facilitated a “comprehensive” ceasefire signed on July 18, 2019, were equally unsuccessful at curtailing Russia’s aggression.
The last meeting of the format took place on Feb. 10, 2022, just two weeks before the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion on Feb. 24, 2022.
